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Abstract: As a new force on the political scene of Serbia after the 1903 Coup which 
brought the Karadjordjević dynasty back to the throne and restored democratic order, 
the Serbian army, led by a group of conspiring officers, perceived itself as the main 
guardian of the country’s sovereignty and the principal executor of the sacred mission 
of national unification of the Serbs, a goal which had been abandoned after the 1878 
Berlin Treaty. During the “Golden Age” decade (1903–1914) in the reign of King 
Peter I, Serbia emerged as a point of strong attraction to the Serbs and other South 
Slavs in the neighbouring empires and as their potential protector. In 1912–13, Serbia 
demonstrated her strength by liberating the Serbs in the “unredeemed provinces” of 
the Ottoman Empire. The main threat to Serbia’s very existence was multinational 
Austria-Hungary, which thwarted Belgrade’s aspirations at every turn. The Tariff  
War (1906–1911), the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908), and the coercing 
of Serbia to cede her territorial gains in northern Albania (1912–1913) were but epi-
sodes of this fixed policy. In 1991, the Serbian army officers, frustrated by what they 
considered as weak reaction from domestic political forces and the growing external 
challenges to Serbia’s independence, formed the secret patriotic organisation “Uni-
fication or Death” (Black Hand). Serbian victories in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) 
enhanced the prestige of the military but also boosted political ambitions of Lt.-Col-
onel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević Apis and other founding members of the Black Hand 
anxious to bring about the change of government. However, the idea of a military 
putsch limited to Serbian Macedonia proposed in May 1914 was rejected by promi-
nent members of the Black Hand, defunct since 1913. This was a clear indication 
that Apis and a few others could not find support for their meddling in politics. The 
government of Nikola P. Pašić, supported by the Regent, Crown Prince Alexander, 
called for new elections to verify its victory against those military factions that acted 
as an “irresponsible factor” with “praetorian ambitions” in Serbian politics. This trial of 
strength brings new and valuable insights into the controversial relationship between 
the Young Bosnians and the Black Hand prior to the Sarajevo assassination in June 
1914.
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The restoration of democracy and Serbia’s Piedmont role among South Slavs
I
n her “Golden Age” (1903–1914) during the reign of King Peter I Kara-
djor  djević, Serbia was capable of resisting manifold internal and external 
crises due to her functioning democracy and internal consensus on both 
foreign policy orientation and wider national goals. The external challenges 
were mostly resolved by spectacular victories in the Balkan Wars, while the 
internal strife, marked by military-civilian rivalries, mirrored the intensive 
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regrouping of the social forces struggling to further the democratic system, 
recover the country’s crippled economy and redefine the position of Serbia 
as a developing country. 
During the reign of the two last sovereigns of the House of Obrenović, 
from 1881 to 1903, Serbia was under the predominant influence of Austria-
Hungary.1 After the 1903 Coup and the change on the throne, Serbia pur-
sued an independent foreign policy which was manifested in her orienta-
tion towards Russia and France. With the new regime recognised and the 
main protagonists of the 1903 regicide sent into retirement by 1906, Serbia 
gradually came to rely politically and economically on the Franco-Russian 
Alliance, which eventually evolved into the Triple Entente.2 
In 1903 the Kingdom of Serbia had an area of 48,500 sq. km and a 
population of 2,922,058 inhabitants. Immigration from the neighbouring 
Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires grew steadily. There were roughly 
two million Serbs in the Dual Monarchy and one million in Turkey-in-
Europe (Old Serbia and Slavic Macedonia). The Serbs, scattered in various 
provinces of the two empires, were deprived of their basic human and col-
lective rights. Throughout Turkey-in-Europe, and particularly in Old Serbia 
(Vilayet of Kosovo), they were subjected to continuous terror by Albanian 
kaçaks and blackened by Austro-Hungarian propaganda since Viennese di-
plomacy openly supported Albanian claims in the whole area. The Chris-
tian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina struggled to preserve their national and 
cultural identity denied by the imposed pan-Bosnian policy of the Austro-
Hungarian governor, Benjamin von Kállay (1883–1903), and those in the 
region of Vojvodina (Banat, Bačka, Baranja) opposed the assimilation policy 
of the Hungarian government. Not surprisingly, all of them were looking 
to Serbia as their potential protector. Serbia’s sister state, tiny Montene-
gro, with roughly 317,000 valiant highlanders, was the only reliable ally in 
the region, although the rivalry between the Montenegrin Prince, Nicho-
1 Independent since 1878, Serbia became a client state of the Dual Monarchy under the 
stipulations of the 1881 Secret Convention that was renewed in 1889. Although she 
was proclaimed Kingdom in March 1882, Serbia was obliged to conform her foreign 
policy to Austria-Hungary’s requirements, including the disavowal of any aspiration to-
wards Bosnia-Herzegovina occupied by the Dual Monarchy in 1878. In return, Vienna 
was expected to facilitate Serbia’s expansion in the south towards the Skoplje area in 
Old Serbia. English translation of the 1881 Secret Convention is published in Alfred 
Francis Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary 1879–1914, vol. I (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1920), 51–63. Grégoire Yakchitch [Grgur Jakšić], Le Traité 
secret austro-serbe du 28 janvier 1881 et du 9 février 1889 (Paris: R. Pellerin, 1938).
2 Dimitrije Djordjević, “The Serbs as an integrating and disintegrating factor”, Austrian 
History Yearbook, vol. 3, Pt. 2 (1967), 72–82. D. T. Bataković, Storm over Serbia  309
las Petrović Njegoš (King from 1910), and his son-in-law, King Peter I 
Karadjordjević, often made this collaboration difficult.3 
The social and political situation in post-1903 Serbia was quite ap-
pealing to the Serb compatriots abroad: roughly seventy percent of Serbia’s 
male population enjoyed voting rights as opposed to less than twenty per-
cent in the Serb- and South Slav-inhabited provinces of Austria-Hungary. 
Furthermore, Serbian peasants (roughly eighty-seven percent of the popu-
lation) were owners of their small and medium-size land holdings, whereas 
most of their compatriots in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Turkey-in-Europe 
were feudal serfs of Muslim beys. Freedom of the press and the develop-
ment of democratic institutions in Serbia amplified her cultural impact on 
the Serbs living in the neighbouring empires. Out of 218 Serbian dailies in 
1911, more than a half were published in Serbia (125). In 1912, out of 302 
Serbian newspapers and journals, 199 were published in Serbia, of which 
126 in Belgrade alone (24 dailies, 20 periodicals which mostly published 
literary texts and scholarly articles, and 82 publications devoted to com-
mercial, bussiness, agrarian and other topics).4 
King Peter I Karadjordjević, who had published his own Serbian trans-
lation of John Stuart Mill’s essay “On Liberty” in 1867, was a French-educat-
ed liberal genuinely committed to the rules of constitutional monarchy. He 
was the grandson of Kara George (Karadjordje Petrović), the leader of the 
1804 Serbian Revolution, and the son of Prince Alexander Karadjordjević 
(1842–1858), the ruler of Serbia in her initial phase of modernisation and 
Europeanisation. A graduate of the French Saint-Cyr military academy, Peter 
I excelled in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 and became widely known 
as a guerrilla leader of the Bosnian Serbs in their insurrection against the Ot-
toman Empire (1876–1878), during which he became known under the nom 
de guerre Petar Mrkonjić. Unlike the last Obrenović monarchs, King Peter I 
was not an authoritarian ruler, which was often interpreted as his weakness 
and lack of resolve. During his four decades in exile, Peter I had experienced 
the real values of parliamentary democracy and political liberties, and he un-
derstood their advantage for a developing country such as Serbia was at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. In spite of the initial diplomatic boycott 
3 D. Djordjević, “Srbija i Balkan na početku XX veka (1903–1908)“, in Jugoslovenski 
narodi pred Prvi svetski rat, Monographies de l’Academie serbe des Sciences et des Arts, 
vol. CDXVI, Classe des sciences sociales, No. 61 (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sci-
ences and Arts, 1967), 207–230.
4 Jovan Skerlić, Istorija nove srpske književnosti (Belgrade: Izdavačka knjižara S. K. 
Cvijanovića, 1914), quoted from the reprinted edition (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1967), 436. 
Cf. also Jovan Skerlić, Istorijski pregled srpske štampe 1791–1911 (Belgrade: Izdavačka 
knjižara S. K. Cvijanovića, 1912). Balcanica XLIV (2013) 310
he had to endure (1903–1906) – due to the unfulfilled demands for the pun-
ishment of the main organisers of the 1903 Coup – King Peter I soon became 
a symbol of democracy and national freedom. Praised as the future king of 
Yugoslavia by the liberal youth in Vienna in 1903, Peter I epitomised an ap-
pealing mixture of pan-Serbian and pan-Yugoslav expectations.5
Two dominant post-1903 political parties – Old Radicals led by 
Nikola P. Pašić and Independent Radicals headed by Ljubomir Stojanović – 
successfully combined the doctrine of French Radicalism with the domestic 
traditions of local self-government, and pursued a highly popular Russophile 
course in foreign policy. Pašić’s Old Radicals, however, proved to be more 
successful: in eight years they formed eight homogeneous cabinets and vic-
toriously ended the Balkan Wars (1912–1913). The Independent Radicals 
were able to form just one short-lived homogeneous cabinet (1905–1906).
There were also several coalition cabinets consisting of the two rival Radical 
factions – such cabinets were favoured by the King.6 
The political programmes of both Radical factions advocated the 
unification of all Serbs in the Balkans into a single state. The Independent 
Radicals emphasised the need to foster “Yugoslav cooperation” in their 1905 
programme.7 South Slavic cooperation and the Yugoslav idea, in particu-
lar, based on cultural and linguistic kinship and common national inter-
ests, were an enlightened alternative to centuries-long foreign domination 
with the attendant discrimination against and repression of the South Slavs. 
Both Radical parties were, however, aware of the importance of Serbia’s 
democratic transformation for the unification of Serbs. Democracy revived 
hopes that both Serbian and Yugoslav unification were possible within the 
liberal and democratic framework. In his programmatic speech at an Old 
Radical rally in November 1911, Pašić laid emphasis on democracy as a 
main pillar of national unification: “It is earnestly expected that a Serbia 
with constitutional and parliamentary order could become the Piedmont 
of Serbs; only an open-minded Serbia can attract Serbs, and only by being 
armed and well prepared can she fulfil her Piedmont-like pledge.”8 
5 Alfred Stead, “King Peter I of Serbia”, Review of Reviews (September 1906), 245–250; 
Alex N. Dragnich, “King Peter I. Culmination of Serbia’s Struggle for Parliamentary 
Government”, East European Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 2 (1970).
6 D. Djordjević, “Parlamentarna kriza u Srbiji 1905. godine, Istorijski časopis, vol. XIV–
XV (1963–1965), 157–172.
7 See the programmes of the political parties in Serbia in Vasilije Krestić and Radoš 
Ljušić, Programi i statuti srpskih političkih stranaka do 1918. godine (Belgrade: Književne 
novine, 1991).
8 Spomenica Nikole P. Pašića, 1845–1925 (Belgrade: Pavlović & Co., 1926), 175. For more 
on Pašić see Nikola Pašić. Život i delo. Zbornik radova sa naučnog skupa u Srpskoj akademiji 
nauka i umetnosti 1995. (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 1997). D. T. Bataković, Storm over Serbia  311
The policy of Croat-Serbian cooperation (1905–1906) in the Hun-
garian province of Croatia-Slavonia and in the Austrian province of Dal-
matia – both provinces with a high percentage of Serb population – was 
warmly welcomed in Serbia, in particular among the pro-Yugoslav Inde-
pendent Radicals. Their leader, Ljubomir Stojanović, met with the leader 
of the Dalmatian Croats, Frano Supilo, in the town of Rijeka. The latter 
visited Belgrade in 1905 and, with Prime Minister Pašić and some promi-
nent Independent Radicals, discussed the possibilities of intensifying coop-
eration.9 
The coronation of King Peter I in Belgrade in 1904, along with the 
celebration of the centennial of the First Serbian Insurrection under Kara 
George (1804), was attended by many representatives of the intellectual 
and political elites from all the Serb-inhabited and Yugoslav lands.10 The 
King himself received various delegations, including that of the pro-Yugo-
slav youth from Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, expressing lively interest 
in Serbo-Croat rapprochement. Belgrade emerged as an ambitious cultural 
hub  and meeting place for various liberal, pro-Yugoslav gatherings: in Sep-
tember 1904, the Serbian capital hosted the first congress of the Yugoslav 
youth and the first congress of Yugoslav writers and journalists (with rep-
resentatives of the Serbian, Bulgarian, Croatian and Slovenian societies). 
Various Yugoslav-inspired conferences and artistic meetings were organised 
in Belgrade, Niš and other Serbian towns, attracting numerous intellectuals, 
from teachers and painters to journalists and writers.11 As early as 1904, a 
group of young intellectuals and students founded a Belgrade-based associ-
ation, the “Slavic South” (Slovenski jug), which advocated the unification of 
all Yugoslavs (the heading of their journal contained two mottos: “Southern 
Slavs unite!” and “A revolution in the unredeemed lands!”). Special Yugoslav 
evenings were regularly held on the promenade of the fortress of Belgrade. 
The goal of the “Slavic South” was to “spread the Yugoslav idea and coop-
eration in the Balkans”. The impact of this intensified interaction between 
Serbia and the Yugoslav movement in Austria-Hungary raised additional 
concern in Vienna.12
9 More in Mirjana Gross, Vladavina hrvatsko-srpske koalicije 1906–1907 (Belgrade: In-
stitut za društvene nauke, 1960).
10 The term Yugoslav lands reffers to the provinces in Austria-Hungary inhabited by the 
Serbs and other South Slavs (Croats, Slovenes and Bosnian Muslims). 
11 Cf. Jovan Skerlić, “Omladinski kongresi”, Srpski književni glasnik, vol. IX (1904), 
123–127.
12 Dragoslav Janković, “Jugoslovenstvo u Srbiji 1903–1912”, Anali Pravnog fakulteta u 
Beogradu, vol. XVII (1969), 523–535.Balcanica XLIV (2013) 312
Belgrade assumed the leading role in a movement for wider under-
standing between Serbia and the other Yugoslav nations. The most emi-
nent Serbian scholars, such as geographer Jovan Cvijić, historians Stojan 
Novaković and Slobodan Jovanović, literary historians Jovan Skerlić and 
Bogdan Popović, and linguist Alexander Belić, were fairly successful in ex-
plaining to the public, in a convincing and politically reasonable manner, 
that the wider Yugoslav framework would be the best basis for a permanent 
solution of the Serbian question, i.e. pan-Serbian unification.13 The schol-
arly basis for the Yugoslav idea was formulated by Jovan Cvijić: he expound-
ed the theory that the Dinaric Alps in the Balkans constituted a distinc-
tive geopolitical unit with an almost uniform ethnic composition formed 
through countless historical migrations. Professor Cvijić identified several 
related cultural and civilisation patterns (“cultural belts”), among which the 
strongest was that of patriarchal culture in the vast area of the Dinaric Alps 
stretching through most of Montenegro, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Dalmatia 
and the Croatian littoral.14
A number of French-educated Serbian intellectuals were ardent pro-
moters of civil liberties, universal suffrage, and French-inspired doctrines of 
the sovereign rights of every single South Slav nation, contrary to the notion 
of Habsburg-inspired historic privileges.15 Through their activities, the na-
tional model for resolving the Serbian question slowly started to develop into 
a new, cultural, model: as the basis for national unification, Skerlić suggested 
the adoption of the Serbian ekavian (ekavski) dialect and Latin (instead of 
Cyrillic) script in order to overcome the differences between several dialects 
of the common Serbo-Croat language.16 The model of a unified Yugoslav na-
tion fitted well into the historical experience of the Serbs, for whom the state 
and the nation were one and the same thing.17 Serbian intellectuals combined 
13 Probably the most famous text is Stojan Novaković’s prediction on the common 
future of Yugoslavs in the century to come: “Nakon sto godina. Beograd, 15. maj 
2011”, in Hrvatsko-srpski almanah (Zagreb-Belgrade 1911), 9–19; cf. more in Dimitrije 
Djordjević, “Stojan Novakovic: Historian, Politician, Diplomat”, Serbian Studies, vol. 3, 
nos. 3–4 (1985), 39–67. 
14 Jovan Cvijić, Antropogeografski problemi Balkanskog poluostrva (Belgrade: chez l’auteur 
1902); Émile Haumant, Le pays dinarique et les types Serbes d’après Mr. Jovan Cvijić (Pa-
ris: Libraire A. Colin, 1915).
15 D. T. Bataković, Les sources françaises de la démocratie serbe, 1804–1914 (Paris: CNRS, 
2013), 357–383.
16 On Skerlić see Midhat Begić, Jovan Skerlić et la critique littéraire en Serbie (Paris: 
Institut d’Études slaves, 1963).
17 The one-sided portrayal of post-1903 Serbia in Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalk-
ers. How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 2012), 
in particular the chapter “Serbian Ghosts” (a reference to Kaplan’s “Balkan Ghosts”), D. T. Bataković, Storm over Serbia  313
the usual pan-Serbian programme, which was popular in the army ranks and 
among most of the urban and rural population, with the Yugoslav programme, 
by explaining that the unification of Serbs would at the same time bring about 
a union with “our brothers” from the mixed South Slav areas. 
is biased and often misleading. Viewing Serbia’s political ambitions as extremely na-
tionalistic, Clark entirely neglects Serbia’s role as an attractive model of democratic 
development, the offspring of liberal ideas, the main cultural hub and a meeting point 
of all liberal-minded intellectuals among the South Slavs, including, in many cases, 
Bulgarians. Equally disappointing, and even more inaccurate, in depicting Serbia’s role 
in the Balkans prior to the Great War is Margaret MacMillan, The War that Ended Peace. 
How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War (London: Profile Books, 2013), 
511–539. Her comparison, for instance, of post-1904 Serbian guerilla in Macedonia 
with present-day Iran and the smuggling of arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon is out of any 
rational historical context (p. 514). Sean McMeekin, July 1914: Countdown to War (New 
York: Basic Books, 2013), 48–52, 172–175, also shows little, if any, understanding of 
Serbia’s position. Lacking the knowledge of the Serbian language, political mentality 
and relevant historiography concerning the Western Balkans in general, and Serbia in 
particular, these authors embrace age-old stereotypes as a genuine historical framework. 
A scholarly analysis of Serbia’s impact as a democratic model and cultural hub can be 
found in Michael Boro Petrovich, History of Modern Serbia 1804–1918, vol. II (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 534–604; Dušan T. Bataković, ed., Histoire 
du peuple serbe (Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 2005), 185–200; cf. also Andrej Mitrović, 
Serbia’s Great War (London: Hurst & Co., 2007). At least a dozen books and many 
articles written mostly by French intellectuals, scholars, travel writers and journalists 
who visited Serbia between 1903 and 1914, show how they were pleasantly suprised by 
the intensity of intelectual life, the level of education among the political elite and the 
military as well as by the democratic spirit of Serbia’s population at large. See e.g. Joseph 
Mallat, La Serbie contemporaine, 2 vols. (Paris: Librairie orientale et américaine J. Mai-
sonneuve, 1902); André Chéradame, L’Europe et la question d’Autriche au seuil du XXe 
siècle (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1903); Louis Leger, Souvenirs d’un slavophile (1863–1897) 
(Paris: Libraire Hachette 1905); Gabriel Louis Jaray, Chez les Serbes, Notes de voyage 
(Paris: Bureau des Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, 1906); Alphonse Muzet, Aux 
pays balkaniques. Monténégro, Serbie, Bulgarie (Paris: Pierre Roget et Cie, 1912); Louis 
Leger, Serbes Croates et Bulgares. Études historiques, politiques et littéraires (Paris: Maison-
neuve, 1913); Gaston Gravier, “L’émancipation économique de la Serbie”, Bulletin de la 
Société de Géographie commerciale de Paris, vol. 33, no. 6 (June 1911), 417–431; Gaston 
Gravier, “Le développement économique de la Serbie”, Annales de Géographie, vol. 21, 
no. 115 (1912), 50–56; idem, “La nouvelle Serbie”, Revue de Paris, 15 novembre 1913; 
Henry Barby, Les victoires serbes (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1913; Jean Pélissier, Dix mois de 
guerre dans les Balkans (Paris: Perrin, 1914); Pierre De Lanux, La Yougoslavie. La France 
et les Serbes (Paris: Payot et Cie, 1916). An analysis in Elisabet Joël, “Les intellectuells 
françaises et la Serbie à la veille de la Premiere Guerre mondiale”, in La France et la 
Serbie de Congrès de Berlin à la crise de juillet 1914. Actes du Colloque franco-serbe 
de Strasbourg (Decembre 1996), Revue d’Europe Centrale, vol. VII, no. 1 (Strasbourg 
1999), 115–126.Balcanica XLIV (2013) 314
The growing cultural prestige of Belgrade was reflected in the leading 
literary journal in the Slavic South, Serbian Literary Herald (Srpski književni 
glasnik) founded in 1901 by a group of younger, Western-educated intellec-
tuals. Under the prevailing influence of the Independent Radicals and the 
leftist faction of the Liberals (Ljubomir Stojanović, Jovan Skerlić, Bogdan 
Popović, Vojislav Veljković), Serbian Literary Herald – based on liberal and 
democratic convictions, in an open dialogue with European values and vari-
ous cultural models – was a sophisticated promoter of Serbian culture and 
scholarship as well as the Serbian democracy and South Slav cooperation.18 
The Belgrade literary style, inspired by the elegant and clear French style, 
soon set the standard for South Slav intellectuals.19 The University of Bel-
grade, with 1,600 students in 1910 and its internationally renowned profes-
sors (including mathematicians Mihailo Petrović and Milutin Milanković, 
geologist  Jovan  M.  Žujović,  archaeologist  Miloje  Vasić,  chemist  Sima 
Lozanić), attracted many students from Bosnia, Dalmatia and Bulgaria. 
Furthermore, various publications of the Serbian Royal Academy (includ-
ing multi-volume monographs by Jovan Cvijić and other prominent geog-
raphers, anthropologists, historians, art historians etc.), along with the work 
of Serbian-American scientists, such as inventor Nikola Tesla and Mihailo 
Pupin, professor at the Columbia University, were an encouragement for 
the Serbian academic community and enhanced their prestige on a broader 
Balkan scale.20
On the political level, however, the open pro-Yugoslav orientation 
meant the worsening of the conflict with the Dual Monarchy. The Serbian 
Foreign Minister, Milovan Dj. Milovanović, concluded that “Austria-Hun-
gary is right when she accuses Serbia of pursuing Yugoslav policy; but she is 
forgetting that she [Dual Monarchy] has channelled Serbia, that she in fact 
has forced Serbia onto this path.”21
18 Miloš Ković, “Politička uloga Srpskog književnog glasnika (1901–1914)”, in Sto godina 
Srpskog književnog glasnika, eds. Staniša Tutnjević and Marko Nedić (Belgrade: Matica 
srpska & Institut za književnost i umetnost, 2003), 363–378.
19 Radovan Samardžić, “La langue littéraire serbe et l’influence française à la fin du 
XIXème et au début du XXème siècle”, in Relations franco-yougoslaves. À l’occasion des 
150 ans de l’ouverture du premier consulat français en Serbie (Belgrade: Institut d’histoire, 
1990), 85–90.
20 Petrovich, History of Modern Serbia, vol. 2, 576–592; University of Belgrade 1838–2005. 
The Centennial of the first Serbian University Law [1905], ed. Dejan Popović (Belgrade: 
University of Belgrade, 2005).
21 Dimitrije Djordjević, Milovan Milovanović (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1962), 72.D. T. Bataković, Storm over Serbia  315
The Serbian military in pursuit of political and national goals, 1903–1908
In Serbia, a predominantly agricultural country with egalitarian traditions, 
the army was founded later than other state institutions. The professional 
army founded in the 1880s had not yet turned into a self-sufficient caste 
like elsewhere in Central Europe, where the officer corps consisted mostly 
of aristocrats, landed gentry and lesser nobility. In Serbia, army officers were 
something of a substitute for the middle class. With the growing number 
of cadets coming from the modest rural and urban areas in the late 1890s, 
the younger generations of the officer corps were, in general, sympathetic to 
democracy and gradually became the privileged layer of Serbian society.22 
As a new force on the political scene of Serbia after the 1903 Coup 
that brought the Karadjordjević dynasty back to the throne and restored 
democratic order, the Serbian army led by a group of conspiring officers 
considered itself as the main guardian of the country’s sovereignty and the 
principal executor of the sacred mission of national unification of the Serbs, 
a goal which had been abandoned after the conclusion of the 1878 Berlin 
Treaty. By re-introducing the full-fledged parliamentary system, the mil-
itary conspirators, often sympathisers of the Liberal Party, showed their 
commitment to constitutional monarchy and democratic form of govern-
ment, which were highly popular among the electorate. Breaking away from 
the unpopular patronage of Austria-Hungary, Serbia sought the support of 
Tsarist Russia in pursuit of her national cause i.e. the unification of all the 
Serbs in the Balkans. An obvious challenge to Austro-Hungarian domina-
tion in the Balkans, the unification of Serbs was viewed in Vienna not just 
as the creation of a “Greater Serbia”, but also as a first step towards Yugoslav 
unification at some point in the future.23 
Foreign observers, under the spell of the highly negative image of 
Serbia after the 1903 regicide and relentless anti-Serbian propaganda ema-
nating from Austria-Hungary, were often doubtful about the real capacity of 
22 D. T. Bataković, “Nikola Pašić, les radicaux et la ’Main noire’. Les défis à la démocratie 
parlementaire serbe 1903–1917”, Balcanica XXXVII (2006), 146–149. For more on the 
proccedings and promulgated laws of the National Assembly of Serbia see Georges 
Pavlovitch, “Serbie. Notice générale sur les travaux de l’Assemblée nationale en 1905”, 
Annuaire de législation étrangère (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 
1906); idem, “Serbie. Notice générale sur les travaux de la Skoupchtina et les lois pro-
mulguées en 1907”, Annuaire de législation étrangère (Paris: Librairie de droit et de ju-
risprudence 1908) ; “Serbie. Notice générale sur les travaux de la Skoupchtina et les lois 
promulguées en 1908”, Annuaire de législation étrangère (Paris: Librairie de droit et de 
jurisprudence 1909). 
23 D. T. Bataković, “The Balkan Piedmont. Serbia and the Yugoslav Question”, Dia-
logue no. 10 (1994), 25–73; idem, Yougoslavie. Nations, religions, idéologies (Lausanne: 
L’Age d’Homme, 1994), 91–99. Balcanica XLIV (2013) 316
“rural democracy” in Serbia.24 Unsympathetic Viennese Balkan correspon-
dents were convinced that the insufficient level of political culture among 
the rural electorate as well as heated partisan politics were an impediment 
to a proper democratic order, but the post-1903 parliamentary system in 
Serbia was functioning surprisingly well. Parliamentary democracy in Ser-
bia was fully restored by the 1903 Constitution which was a slightly revised 
version of the very liberal Constitution of 1888.25 Within such constitution-
al framework, governments were formed from the parliamentary majority 
resulting from quite free and fair elections. At the same time, the military 
groups involved in the 1903 Coup increasingly interfered in politics. Once 
an important prop of the personal regimes of the last Obrenović rulers, the 
former conspirators within the officer corps were now praised as the restor-
ers of democracy, and they sought to exploit this favourable situation by 
carving out their own share of influence, beyond the control of the freely 
elected members of parliament and cabinet ministers.26
After having been absent from Serbia from 1858 and without wider 
support in Serbian society despite his family background, Peter I, the new 
sovereign of Serbia, was dependent on the army as the mainstay of his rule. 
The conspirators who had taken control over the Serbian army in 1903 
banked on the prestige derived from their role in the change of dynasty 
and the restoration of constitutional order: they were officially praised by 
24 A major reason for virulent anti-Serbian propaganda in Austria-Hungary was the 
change in Serbia’s foreign policy. Formerly a client state of the Dual Monarchy, Serbia 
turned to St. Petersburg and Paris: “C’est pourquoi Vienne résolut de noircir ce pays, 
de le charger de crimes, d’en détacher progressivement ses amis et d’en faire une sorte 
de paria. Laborieuse campagne d’accusation, d’insinuation, de calomnies comme on 
n’en vit jamais, malaisée a mener, mais qu’entreprend avec une adroite obstination le 
Correspondenzbureau de Vienne, à la solde du ministère des Affaires étrangères. Nul 
n’était mieux qualifie pour distiller le poison. On sait comment elles s’arrondissent et 
sont artificiellement gonflées. Celle-ci furent soufflées au point qu’elles crevèrent tôt 
après qu’elles eussent été lancées vers les foules curieuses, comme des bulles de savon 
trop grosses. Des hommes de bon sens, cependant, ont entendu cette voix perfide qui 
venait sur un rythme cajoleur de valse, porter la calomnie jusqu’au fond de l’Europe.” 
Quoted from Rene Chambry, Pierre Ier. Roi de Serbie (Paris–Barcelone: Bloud et Gay, 
1917), 16–17.
25 Dimitrije Djordjevic, “Serbian Society, 1903–1914”, in Bela A. Kiraly & Dimitrije 
Djordjevic, eds., East Central European Society in the Balkan Wars (Boulder & New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987), 227–239; cf. also: D. T. Bataković, “O parlamentarnoj 
demokratiji u Srbiji, 1903–1914. Stranke, izbori, političke slobode”, GLAS, vol. CDXX 
de l’ Académie serbe des Sciences et des Arts, Classe des sciences historiques, no. 16 
(Belgrade: Académie serbe des Sciences, 2012), 391–408.
26 For a more detailed analysis see Wayne S. Vucinich, Serbia between East and West. The 
Events of 1903–1908 (Stanford: Stanford University Publications, 1954), 61–87.D. T. Bataković, Storm over Serbia  317
the National Assembly on two occasions for having put an end to an auto-
cratic regime. Not surprisingly, they soon became increasingly involved in 
domestic politics.27 The older conspirators were quick to install their own 
supporters to key positions in the army. The King’s aides-de-camp, chiefs 
of the General Staff, commandants of military schools and other military 
institutions, brigade and division commanders, were exclusively recruited 
from the military personnel loyal to the conspirators regardless of their 
rank, experience and skills. Operative duties were performed by an echelon 
of younger conspirators, with Dragutin T. Dimitrijević Apis, Velimir Vemić, 
Antonije Antić, Božin Simić, Vladimir Tucović, Milan Gr. Milovanović, 
Peter Živković and Josif Kostić constituting the core of the group.28
Some eighty active officers did not conceal their ambition to take full 
control over the main army posts and then exert their behind-the-scenes 
influence on the political decision-making process in matters concerning 
not just the armed forces but also vital national interests. While the con-
spirators promoted their own supporters, the King was mostly relying on 
highly respected senior officers with impeccable careers and no connection 
with the 1903 conspiracy. His favourites were Radomir Putnik, the first of-
ficer promoted to the rank of general under King Peter I, and Colonel Stepa 
Stepanović, who became commander of the Šumadija Division (Šumadijska 
divizija) and was promoted to the rank of general in 1907. Their military 
qualities were considered exceptional. In the years to come, they were, Put-
nik in particular, considered to be close to the ruling Old Radicals, but still 
protective of the conspirators and strongly against any pro-Obrenović (i.e. 
pro-Austrian) stream in the officer corps. Yet another outstanding officer 
was Colonel Živojin Mišić, an open critic of the conspirators’ role in the 
army: having been retired, he was reactivated through the mediation of the 
Old Radicals’ leader Nikola Pašić in 1907.29 
Under the post-1903 Radical governments, the Serbian army, despite 
all praises and the influence it exerted on public opinion, was profoundly 
dissatisfied with its funding and equipment. The purchase of modern can-
27 Dragiša Vasić, Devetstotreća. Majski prevrat (Belgrade: Štamparija “Tucović”, 1928), 
183–193; Ljiljana Aleksić Pejković, Odnosi Srbije s Francuskom i Engleskom 1903–1914 
(Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1965), chapters I–IV; Vladimir Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914 
(Belgrade: Prosveta, 1978), vol. II, chapters XVII–XVIII; Dimitrije Djordjević, “The 
Role of the Military in the Balkans in the Nineteenth Century”, in Ralph Melville & 
Hans-Jürgen Schroeder, eds., Der Berliner Kongress von 1878 (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 
1982), 317–347; D. T. Bataković, “Sukob vojnih i civilnih vlasti u Srbiji u proleće 1914”, 
Istorijski časopis XXIX–XXX (1982–1983), 477–492. 
28 Vucinich, Serbia between East and West, 102–112; Dragoljub R. Živojinović, Kralj Pe-
ter I Karadjordjević, vol. II U Otadžbini 1903–1914 (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1990), 237–243.
29 Živojin Mišić, Moje uspomene (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1978), 239–240.Balcanica XLIV (2013) 318
nons from the French company Schneider-Creusot, a first phase of rearma-
ment, was perceived as an important step towards political independence 
from the Dual Monarchy. The contract with Schneider-Creusot was signed 
on 7 November 1906, and five days later, a loan agreement for ninety-five 
million francs at the interest rate of 4.5 percent was concluded in Geneva 
with a financial group dominated by French banks. This agreement meant 
that Serbia was emancipating herself from Austria-Hungary not just politi-
cally, but also financially, which was one of the army’s priorities. 
 The Old 
Radical cabinet’s decision to purchase cannons in France was supported by 
the patriotic wing of younger conspirators, while only few of the older con-
spirators (Colonels Damnjan Popović and Peter Mišić), who still hoped to 
obstruct the Old Radical government and prevent their own retirement, in-
sisted on the puchase of military equipment from the Austrian Škoda.30 The 
temporary alliance between the Old Radical government and the younger 
conspirators proved to be beneficial: it facilitated the retirement of six senior 
officers involved in the 1903 regicide – a gesture required by the British 
King – which ended the three years’ long “diplomatic strike” against Ser-
bia. The older conspirators identified by Sir Edward Grey were: General 
Jovan Atanacković, Head of the Bureau of Decorations; Colonel Damnjan 
Popović, Commander of the Danube Division; Colonel Peter Mišić, a tutor 
to the Crown Prince; Aleksandar Mašin, Acting Chief of Staff; Colonel 
Luka Lazarević, Commander of the Belgrade Garrison; Colonel Leonida 
Solarević, Head of the Military Academy; Major Ljubomir Kostić, Com-
mander of the Palace. Apart from Solarević, they were all retired and “with 
a fine appreciation for historic dates, diplomatic relations between Great 
Britain and Serbia were renewed on June 11, 1906, the third anniversary of 
King Alexander’s assassination”.31
The military elite’s sense of the national mission that was to be car-
ried out – taken as a self-evident patriotic duty after the 1903 regicide – 
did not reflect the general political climate in Serbia. Suddenly caught in 
the vortex of day-to-day politics, the military in general, and the former 
conspirators in particular, had little understanding for the frequent com-
promises that politicians were willing to make in order to gain the trust 
and sympathy of the vacillating electorate, public opinion and the Crown. 
Influential military circles believed that the change of dynasty, carried out 
at the cost of many officers’ lives, would only be justified if the struggle for 
30 Aleksić-Pejković, Odnosi Srbije, 110–113. For more detail see Dimitrije Djordjević, 
Carinski rat između Austro-Ugarske i Srbije 1906–1911 (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 
1962). 
31 Petrovich, History of Modern Serbia, vol. II, 541. See also Aleksić-Pejković, Odnosi 
Srbije, 184–185; Živojinović, Kralj Peter I Karadjordjević, vol. II, 280–281.D. T. Bataković, Storm over Serbia  319
the national cause (i.e. national unification) began soon. The foreign policy 
orientation towards Russia was welcomed by the common people and the 
military alike. Given the division of Great Powers in two rivalling blocs, 
the reliance on St. Petersburg was supposed to counterbalance the mount-
ing pressures and threats from Vienna during the Tariff War (1906–1911), 
which saw the embargo on Serbian exports to Austro-Hungarian markets. 
Moreover, with the political situation in the Balkans gradually aggravating 
– from the Great Powers’ failed reforms in Turkey-in-Europe (Old Serbia 
and Macedonia, 1903–1908) through the Annexation Crisis (1908–1909) 
to the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) – the role of the Serbian army as the guar-
antor of the country’s independence grew in importance.
Counter-conspiracies: Opposition to the active role of the military 
in political life
The officer corps was increasingly disgruntled with the behaviour of the 
leading figures among the former conspirators. Many Serbian officers who 
had not been involved in the 1903 conspiracy justified their act believing 
that the motives behind it had been profoundly patriotic, but they also be-
lieved that the military had to remain strictly within the limits defined by 
the constitution – an armed force that recognised the political institutions 
of a parliamentary democracy and was subject to civil control. On the other 
hand, the opponents of the conspirators, whose number was not insignifi-
cant, argued that the conspirators had broken the oath of allegiance to the 
Crown and disgraced the entire officer corps. They believed that the military 
had no place in politics: the conspirators should be expelled from the army 
in order to prevent legitimisation of a dangerous precedent which would 
pave the way for further meddling in politics on the part of the army. Fa-
vouritism towards the conspirators in the promotion through army ranks 
added to the embitterment of the officers who disapproved of the 1903 
regicide either for dynastic reasons or in principle. 
The rift over the role of the military in politics was growing, but 
there was never a danger of the militarisation of the entire Serbian society, 
which on the whole remained committed to its hard-won democracy and 
generally satisfied with the level of political freedoms. As reported by the 
British Minister at Belgrade in 1906 “[…] the spirit of the nation, once 
it had attained self-government was, and remains, distinctly democratic. 
When King Peter came to the throne, therefore, it was evidently considered 
the wisest course to appease the outraged sentiments of the great majority 
of the nation, who had no part in the [1903] conspiracy, by reverting to the 
most liberal constitution, that of 1889 [22 December 1888, Old Style], 
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the monarchy is strictly limited, and the Skupshtina is carried on by Min-
isters who are responsible to the National Assembly (Skupshtina), which 
consists of a single Chamber.”32
 Furthermore, political liberties created the atmosphere which en-
couraged the growing dissatisfaction of the military personnel who had not 
been involved in the 1903 Coup with the former conspirators’ privileged 
status in the army. This led to a conflict between the supporters of the con-
spirators and their opponents, known as the “contras” (kontraći). The in-
ternal division in the army led to a revolt in the second largest garrison, in 
Niš, as early as 1903. Another anti-conspirators movement arose among the 
non-commissioned officers and the reserve force in the Kragujevac Gar-
rison in 1906. Both movements were severely suppressed by military au-
thorities and their ringleaders were heavily sentenced. Nevertheless, these 
anti-conspirators movements revealed the unwillingness of the majority of 
the officer corps to engage in politics. The frequency and scale of these 
revolts revealed that most officers were convinced that the army should 
not overstep the limits of its constitutional role. The opponents of the con-
spirators (“contras”), who included some of the finest officers (e.g. Vojin 
Maksimović, Milivoje Nikolajević, Uzun-Mirković), were led by Captain 
Milan Novaković, a brave, strong-willed officer, who had returned from his 
training in France a month after the 1903 Coup. Unrest in the army and the 
conspirators’ ambition to control the entire officer corps caused Novaković 
to draw up a public manifesto “Greatcoats down, us or them!” (Mundire dole, 
mi ili oni!), condemning the officers who had been involved in the regicide. 
His manifesto denounced sixty-eight conspirators for violence, self-interest 
and anarchy and demanded their dishonourable discharge in the interest 
of the King, the country and the army. In mid-August 1903, Novaković 
began to collect signatures among the discontented officers of his own Niš 
Garrison. Frequent rumours to the effect that King intended to send the 
conspirators away from Belgrade helped Novaković in his effort to sway 
more officers to sign the manifesto. According to the initial reports, there 
were about three hundred discontented officers. It was expected that they 
would demand that the King remove or punish at least 1,590 protégés of 
the conspirators, and threaten with mass resignation if their demand was 
not met.33 
32 The National Archives, London, Foreign Office Records, General Correspondence 
[hereafter TNA, FO], General Report on the Kingdom of Servia [Serbia] for the year 
1906, no. 2. Confidential, Belgrade, April 11, 1907.
33 Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris [hereafter M.A.E.], Nouvelle 
Serie [N.S.], Serbie, vol. 3 (1903), no. 76, Belgrade, 13 August 1903; no. 88, Belgrade, 5 
September 1903; see also Vucinich, Serbia between East and West, 71–73.D. T. Bataković, Storm over Serbia  321
The anti-conspirators movement was not anti-dynastic, as its par-
ticipants claimed before the military court, but aimed solely against the 
1903 plotters. Although most of its participants supported the overthrown 
Obrenović dynasty, there was little prospect of success given the fact that 
there was no rightful heir to the throne from the House of Obrenović.34 
The action of Captain Novaković and his comrades mostly remained lim-
ited to the Niš Garrison. The exact number of dissatisfied officers in other 
regiments was a matter of speculation. Captain Novaković spoke before the 
court about 250 of them, and according to other unverified sources there 
were as many as 800 disgruntled officers. Two articles in the London Times 
offered differing estimates. The first one drew on the official report which 
gauged that 800 out of 1,300 officers had joined the revolt against the con-
spirators, while the second one, published a few weeks later, estimated that 
1,000 out of 1,500 officers had been involved. However, other similar ac-
tions, such as that in the Kragujevac Garrison in 1906, assembled a rather 
small group of followers.35 
It was not until the five highest-ranking participants of the 1903 
Coup were retired by the Pašić government in May 1906 – in order to 
appease Great Britain which had suspended diplomatic relations with Ser-
bia after the assassination of King Alexander – that the interference of the 
conspirators and their supporters in politics was curtailed, at least for some 
time. Although he remained close to the army until the outbreak of the war 
in 1914, the King alienated some of the conspirators from the Palace on ac-
count of his resolve not to overstep his constitutional powers.36
The 1908 Annexation Crisis: A trigger for the formation of National Defence 
and Black Hand
Due to the increasing importance of the Yugoslav movement in the South 
Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary after 1903, with Serbia as its potential 
Piedmont, the Viennese government started planning for the future war 
34 A subsequent attempt of some officers from the Niš Garrison to make contact with 
the ex-King Milan’s illegitimate son, Djordje, failed and the mass distribution of his 
pictures in 1904 was not favourably received among common people.
35 Quoted from Slobodan G. Markovich, The British Perception of Serbia and the Balkans, 
1903–1906 (Paris: Dialogue, 2000), 104–106. Cf. also André Barre, La tragédie serbe 
(Paris: Louis Michaud, 1904), 140–148.
36 Nevertheless, there were some doubts regarding the death of Captain Milan Novaković, 
the convicted leader of the anti-conspirators movement in the army. After his daily Za 
Otadžbinu (For Fatherland) had been confiscated by the police, Novaković was arrested 
and killed during an attempt to escape from prison, along with another gendarmerie 
officer, on 27 January 1907. Vucinich, Serbia between East and West, 70–74.Balcanica XLIV (2013) 322
against Serbia as early as 1907. In the summer of 1908, a military plan was 
drawn up envisaging complete dismemberment of Serbia and the partition-
ing of her territory between the Dual Monarchy and Bulgaria. The abolish-
ment of Serbia’s independence was meant to be a kind of internal “cleans-
ing” for Austria-Hungary, seen as a prerequisite for the Monarchy’s future 
consolidation. In Vienna, the future war was referred to as the “sweeping” of 
Serbia with “a steel brush”. Conrad von Hötzendorf, Chief of the General 
Staff of the Austro-Hungarian army, was obsessed with the idea of a pre-
ventive war against Serbia: “Conrad first advocated preventive war against 
Serbia in 1906, and did so again in 1908–1909, in 1912–13, in October 
1913, and May 1914: between January 1913 and 1 January 1914 he pro-
posed Serbian war twenty-five times.”37 Later plans of Austria-Hungary 
for the partitioning of Serbia envisaged the division of her territory be-
tween Bulgaria and Romania, and after the 1912 Balkan War some regions 
of Serbia were supposed to be granted to newly-created Albania, another 
Austro-Hungarian client state.38 
In October 1908, Austria-Hungary proclaimed the annexation of the 
occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a gift to Emperor Francis Joseph I 
for the fifty years of his reign. This move was designed to eliminate what 
had long been condemned in Vienna as “a Greater Serbian danger”. In the 
strategic planning of Austria-Hungary, the annexation was but a transi-
tional measure until the final abolishment of Serbia’s independence and the 
permanent liquidation of the Yugoslav question.39 Count Aehrenthal, the 
Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, explained to the German government 
in the autumn of 1908 the rationale behind Vienna’s Balkan policy: 
With [the Ottoman] Turkey growing weaker and being pushed back to 
Asia, the process of state reorganisation on our south-eastern borders has 
once again been initiated. We have to take a stand in this matter. Thirty 
years ago this was resolved by occupation [of Bosnia-Herzegovina] and 
this time by annexation. Both acts meant dispelling the dreams about the 
creation of a Greater Serbian state between the Danube, the Sava and 
the Adriatic. There is no need for me to point out that this new factor, if 
created, would receive instructions from the outside, from the north-east 
and the West, so that it would not be an element contributing to a peace-
37 Hew Strachan, The Outbreak of the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 86–87.
38 Andrej Mitrović, Prodor na Balkan: Srbija u planovima Austro-Ugarske i Nemačke 
1908–1918 (Belgrade: Nolit, 1981), 72–88. 
39 La Bosnie-Herzégovine à la Skoupchtina nationale du Royaume de Serbie. Discours des 
députés prononcés aux séances du 2 octobre et 2 et 3 janvier 1909 (Belgrade: Imprimerie de 
l’État, 1909); Jovan Cvijić, L’Annexion de la Bosne et la question serbe, avec une préface 
d’Albert Malet (Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie 1909).D. T. Bataković, Storm over Serbia  323
ful course of events in central Europe. In such a crucial phase of our state 
reorganisation which, from our point of view, is better to be called ‘the 
development of the Reich’, one must, when nothing else helps, think about 
applying the ultima ratio in the life of a nation.40 
Aehrenthal, as many other Austro-Hungarian policy-makers, believed 
that Serbia, once conquered and divided, would become another obedient 
province under Habsburg rule, another colonial entity just as Bosnia-Her-
zegovina had been since 1878.41 Bosnia-Herzegovina was indeed the key to 
Austro-Hungarian domination in the Balkans. In 1876, the insurgent Serbs 
in Herzegovina had proclaimed unification with the tiny Serbian Princi-
pality of Montenegro, while the Serb insurgents in Bosnia proclaimed, on 
more than one occasion (on St. Vitus Day, 28 June 1876 and in 1877), uni-
fication with Serbia. The Serb representatives across Bosnia-Herzegovina 
demanded in their petitions to the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin 
to be eventually united with Serbia. The expansion of the two Serbian prin-
cipalities into Bosnia-Herzegovina was halted by Austrian military occupa-
tion, authorised by the Berlin Treaty of 1878. The Austro-Hungarian occu-
pation and, in particular, the policy of Benjamin von Kállay, the governor of 
the occupied provinces, caused strong opposition among the Bosnian Serbs. 
Kállay proclaimed the existence of a single Bosnian nation and adopted the 
Croat dialect as the “state language”. This policy was eventually abandoned 
after  Kallay’s  death  in  1903.42 The  annexation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
with its relative Serb majority, shattered all hopes that this province would 
unite with Serbia.43 Under the combined pressure of Vienna and Berlin, 
40 Quoted in Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum 
Kriegsausbruch 1914 [hereafter ÖUA] (Vienna & Leipzig 1930), vol. I, 2–3. More in 
Vladimir Ćorović, Odnosi Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku (Belgrade: Biblioteka grada 
Beograda, 1992), 206–212, 357–366. 
41 Olof Hoijer, Le comte d’Aehrenthal et la politique de violence (Paris: Plon 1922), 161–
164.
42 Cf. D. T. Bataković, “Prelude to Sarajevo.The Serbian Question in Bosnia and Herze-
govina 1878–1914”, Balcanica XXVII (1986), 122–136, and his, The Serbs of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina. History and Politics (Paris: Dialogue, 1996), 64–78. In Serbian language, 
an excellent in-depth analysis is offered by Tomislav Kraljačić, Kalajev režim u Bosni i 
Hercegovini 1882–1903 (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1987).
43 In 1910, according to the official Austro-Hungarian census, the Christian Orthodox 
Serbs were the largest national group within the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Out of 1,898,044 inhabitants, 825,918 or 43.49 percent were Serbs, in spite of the fact 
that some 40,000 Serbs emigrated from 1908 to 1914. There were 612,137 (32.25%) 
Bosnian Muslims and 434,061 (22.87%) Roman Catholics, mostly Croats. However, 
due to the high birth rate, and with the large agrarian population which amounted 
to 87.92 percent, the Serbs had the highest population growth. The Bosnian Muslim Balcanica XLIV (2013) 324
without Russia’s support and the backing of France and Great Britain, the 
Serbian government was compelled to recognise the annexation in March 
1909 and thus officially renounce any political aspirations towards Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Through the newly-founded patriotic organisation Narodna 
Odbrana (National Defence), Serbia fostered cross-border educational and 
propaganda activities. However, the National Defence was soon reduced to 
maintaining a network of agents who remained in constant contact with 
both civil and military intelligence in Belgrade. 
In the aftermath of the Annexation Crisis, a group of political ac-
tivists and some of the younger officers who had participated in the 1903 
coup, all of whom had gained experience in guerrilla warfare in Ottoman 
Macedonia after 1904, began to discuss the founding of a new patriotic 
organisation which would play a more active role in the pursuit of national 
policy in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey-in-Europe. The intensive 
post-annexation national propaganda in Bosnia died out in March 1909. In 
parallel, national activity in Old Serbia and Macedonia was halted after the 
Young Turks had seized power in 1908: the Serbian government disbanded 
all guerrilla units and turned its efforts to political struggle in the Ottoman 
parliament. 
The spiritus movens of the more active national policy was the journalist 
Ljubomir S. Jovanović Čupa, one of the editors of the Slavic South (Slovenski 
jug). Apart from him, who used his masonic connections to promote Serbian 
and, subsequently, Yugoslav unification, an important role was played by Bog-
dan Radenković, a Serb native of Kosovo and the main organiser of Serbian 
political action in both Kosovo and Slavic Macedonia. When the Serbian 
government rejected his demand for the renewal of guerrilla activities in Old 
Serbia, Radenković, another free mason with excellent connections in the 
region, turned to military officers. Together with Lj. S. Jovanović and several 
officers, Radenković devised a plan for the creation of a new organisation, 
“a club with a revolutionary orientation”, which would coordinate all secret 
activities in the Serb-inhabited provinces under foreign rule. This organisa-
tion was officially founded on 22 May 1911 under the name “Unification or 
Death”, but the public soon dubbed it the Black Hand (Crna Ruka) after a 
popular conspiracy novel. Besides Jovanović and Radenković, the founding 
population was diminished due to growing emigration (140,000 from 1908 to 1914) 
while the Roman Catholic Croats as well as other Roman Catholics (Czechs, Poles, 
Germans) from various areas of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were systematically 
settled in Bosnia-Herzegovina – roughly 230,000 by 1914. Cf. Bataković, “Prelude to 
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document was signed by five officers, including the undisputed leader of the 
younger conspirators, Major Dragutin T. Dimitrijević Apis.44
 The statute and the programme of the organisation were drawn up 
by Jovanović on the pattern of the nineteenth-century Italian Carbonari, 
similar German societies and some ideas of Russian nihilists. The initia-
tion ceremony for new members was largely modelled on masonic initiation 
rituals. The initial programme was focused on foreign policy. Intelligence 
operations were to be carried out on the soil of the two neighbouring em-
pires – Austria-Hungarian and Ottoman – for the purpose of shaping a 
long-term political strategy to which military rather than political factors 
were essential. The ultimate objective was the unification of the Serbs into 
a single state with Serbia, but there were also certain Yugoslav overtones.45 
When in 1912 Major Milan Vasić became secretary of the Narodna Od-
brana, the “Black Hand made an attempt to become its unofficial revolu-
tionary wing”.46 The pro-Yugoslav youth was controlled through the agency 
of Ljubomir Jovanović Čupa, and the Serbian comitadjis (former guerrilla 
fighters in Macedonia) were dealt with by Major Vojislav Tankosić. The 
well-informed British Minister at Belgrade noted such tendencies and he 
was quick to anticipate an imminent armed confrontation with the Dual 
Monarchy.47 Yet, it seems safe to assume that ninety-five percent of the 
Black Hand membership were attracted to the organisation by its patriotic 
goals, and that just a small faction, roughly five percent, including the found-
ers themselves, was inclined to interfere in domestic political affairs.48
44 David MacKenzie, Apis. The Congenial Conspirator. The Life of Colonel Dragutin T. 
Dimitrijević Apis (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1989), 60–65.
45 David MacKenzie, “The ‘Black Hand’ and its Statutes”, East European Quarterly, vol. 
XXV, no. 2 (June 1991), 179–206.
46 The two organisations were quite similar in their social composition; their members 
came from the urban and rural middle class which, to a certain extent, accounts for the 
similarity in their views on the protection of national interests. Č. A. Popović, “Rad 
organizacije ‘Ujedinjenje ili smrt’: pripremanje za balkanski rat”, Nova Evropa XVI/10 
(26 November 1927), 314. 
47 TNA, FO, 371/328, no. 74, Belgrade, 3 October 1907, and no. 16, Belgrade, 5 March 
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48 The clandestine organisation was also inclined towards Yugoslavism: the complex 
relations  between  its  members  (Ljubomir  Jovanović-Čupa,  Milan  Vasić,  Vladimir 
Gaćinović, etc.) and the pro-Yugoslav youth from the Habsburg Monarchy and the 
organisation and the journal Slavic South, remained rather strong before the death of Lj. 
S. Jovanović and M. Vasić. From 1913, the remaining faction of the Black Hand pre-
ferred Greater Serbia to Yugoslavia. See Dragoslav Ljubibratić, Mlada Bosna i Sarajevski 
atentat (Sarajevo: Muzej Grada Sarajeva, 1964), 34–38. Balcanica XLIV (2013) 326
Although it endeavoured to attract a wider circle of young patriots, 
intellectuals and even some members of parliament, the Black Hand re-
mained a military organisation largely consisting of senior officers, the most 
prominent of whom was Major Dragutin T. Dimitrijević Apis. The organi-
sation favoured revolutionary over cultural action without regard for the 
consequences. The essential prerequisite for successful national policy, the 
Black Hand members believed, was a centralised government and a strong 
army. The proclaimed goal was “to create a united Yugoslav [South-Slav] 
kingdom  through  a  war  with  Austria-Hungary”.49  However,  the  initial 
analyses of Austro-Hungarian informers and diplomats focused on its role 
in Serbia’s internal policy: 
Indeed, the greatest danger for Pašić and Radicalism in general are the of-
ficers’ society [the former conspirators], which under the name Black Hand 
increasingly gains ground, and all the discontented elements including 
those who favour the removal of King and his replacement by the Crown 
Prince, join in it.50 
The purpose of the daily Pijemont (Piedmont), published since 1911 
with the support of the highest military circles and the Crown Prince Al-
exander himself (who made a considerable financial contribution), was to 
propagate the secret organisation’s ideas, stress the necessity for coherent 
national action and prepare the political framework for pan-Serbian uni-
fication. These highly popular goals were seen by many as a supplement to 
day-to-day politics and a new manifestation of solidarity among various 
factions of the Serb population in Serbia and abroad.51 
The ideological matrix of the Black Hand, which comprised army 
officers, free masons, ardent patriots and pro-Yugoslav youth, was rather 
incoherent: it ranged from fostering internal solidarity for national issues 
and expounding highly patriotic goals in the field of foreign policy to au-
thoritarian militarism that questioned parliamentary democracy as a politi-
cal system. The articles published in the Pijemont, whose several editors (Lj. 
S. Jovanović Čupa, Kosta Luković and Branko Božović) and some of the 
contributors were free masons, offered a broad spectrum of different views 
on various political issues. Among its frequent contributors the Pijemont 
49 British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1896–1914 [hereafter: B.D.], eds. G. P. 
Gooch & Harold Temperley, vol. X/1 (London: His Majesty Stationery Office, 1933), 
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had several Serbian, Croat and Jewish journalists of both pan-Serbian and 
Yugoslav persuasion, the two being, after all, considered as compatible po-
litical objectives.52
An analysis of the editorials and front-page articles often reveals open 
hostility towards the institutions of parliamentary democracy. From the very 
first issue, released on 16 September 1911, all political parties in Serbia were 
denounced as allegedly “immoral, uncultured and unpatriotic”. The Pijemont 
pointed out that the “state administration is not good. The reputation of state 
officials, the monarch, the government, the National Assembly, has declined 
[…] few are doing their duty. We need to start to cultivate a cult of the state. 
Without such a cult, Serbia cannot feel like a proper state […] On the whole, 
until the people become educated enough, the principle of statism should be 
abided by, and centralism given precedence to decentralisation in all mat-
ters.” Also, according to the Pijemont, “the parliamentary system is not the 
last word of political wisdom. It has been shown that not even in this system 
are the masses the source and issue of power. Demagogy has discredited and 
abused political freedoms. To let it do that any further means to prepare a 
political reaction; for disorder, laxity and insecurity cannot be considered the 
signs of freedom and democracy. When it comes to political freedoms, they 
should be rather moderate, which will match our level of general culture and 
civilisation; only then will political strife cease.”53 
Rumours about the existence of the Black Hand, a Serbian version of 
the Young Turk Organisation, crossed the borders of Serbia and became a 
matter of discussion throughout Europe, which feared further trouble in the 
volatile Balkans. The rumours were detrimental to King Peter I’s standing 
because he was considered to be unwilling or unable to put an end to the 
dissent within the army. The authority of the King and the Karadjordjević 
dynasty was much strengthened by the King’s official visit to the Russian 
Court in March 1910. Pašić won a solid parliamentary majority in the 1910 
elections, concluded a new loan agreement in Paris for military purposes, 
and sought Russia’s support for establishing closer ties between Serbia and 
the Triple Entente. The royal visit to St. Petersburg was arranged through 
the mediation of Pašić himself, who believed that the King’s strengthened 
52  Arhiv  Srpske  Akademije  nauka  i  umetnosti,  Belgrade  [hereafter  ASANU],  no. 
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authority would enhance the prestige of the parliamentary system. The warm 
welcome and respect showed to the King, along with indications that Rus-
sia would provide a substantial financial aid to Serbia, did much to stabilise 
the position of the Karadjordjević dynasty. The openly expressed political 
support of the Russian Emperor was particularly helpful in this respect. 
On the occasion of King Peter I’s second visit to Russia in August 1911, 
Emperor Nicholas II expressed his concerns over the rumours about the ex-
istence of “praetorians” in the Serbian army. It was suspected that those who 
had eliminated the Obrenović dynasty in 1903 might resort to the same 
methods again. The Russian Emperor was also anxious about the republi-
cans among the conspirators. He feared that they might apply in Serbia the 
same strategy as the Young Turks had in the Ottoman Empire.54 
“Unification or Death” was a clandestine organisation, but some in-
formation about it reached the public, especially on occasions when the 
wilful behaviour of some of its members caused an open confrontation with 
civilian authorities.55 Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
1911, Milovan Dj. Milovanović, resisted their pressure to “activate” Serbia’s 
foreign policy in the direction they saw fit. Flexible and skilful, Milovanović 
managed to tie the Black Hand to himself and to channel their energy 
into the revived guerrilla fighting in Old Serbia and Macedonia, where the 
showdown with the Ottoman Empire was approaching fast.56 There was 
some information to the effect that Apis encouraged Milovanović to en-
ter into negotiations for the conclusion of an alliance between Serbia and 
Bulgaria in order to prepare their common action in Turkey-in-Europe. On 
the whole, the common goal of national liberation kept peace between the 
Milovanović cabinet and the clandestine organisation. 
When the leader of the Old Radicals, Nikola Pašić, resumed pre-
miership after the sudden death of Milovanović in July 1912, he became the 
main target of Black Hand’s political attacks. The memoirs written by per-
sons sympathetic to the Black Hand clearly show the organisation’s hostile 
attitude towards the political views and methods of Pašić who, along with 
Stojan M. Protić, the Interior Minister, was singled out as a personification 
of all aberrations of parliamentary democracy which were so passionately 
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reviled on the pages of Pijemont.57 The discrepancy between the modest 
equipment of the army and the ambitious national goals aggravated the ten-
sion between the military and Pašić’s cabinet. This tension stemmed from 
the reluctance of the Old Radicals to increase the military budget up to 
the level requested by the senior officers and justified by the needs of the 
28,000-strong standing army.58
 A serious conflict within the officer corps took place in January 1912 
following the reassignment of some officers from Belgrade to less attractive 
posts in the country. The reassigned officers, who were close to the Crown 
Prince, were transferred after having been suspected of spreading rumours 
about the Black Hand, which caused tensions in the Belgrade Garrison. The 
reassignment was ordered by the War Minister, General Stepa Stepanović, 
at the suggestion of General Miloš Božanović, the influential commander 
of the Belgrade Garrison known for his close connections with the Black 
Hand. It was carried out in the teeth of Crown Prince Alexander’s opposi-
tion. The Crown Prince was ambiguous about supporting the Black Hand 
despite the fact that Apis tried to persuade – in vain – the ailing King Peter 
I to abdicate in favour of his son. He seems to have considered Apis’s group, 
often critical of the Karadjordjevićs, too independent and self-willed to be 
fully trusted.59 
The young Crown Prince – who took after his maternal grandfather 
Nicholas I of Montenegro rather than his prudent and moderate father – 
relied on the support of the officers who pledged their allegiance to him 
personally. This group of officers, which included some of the former con-
spirators (Colonel Peter Mišić, Majors Peter Živković and Josif Kostić), 
constituted the core of the military clique that would later become known 
as the “White Hand” (Bela ruka). Alexander requested the War Minister, 
General Stepanović, one of the main protectors of the Black Hand, to re-
verse his decision. King Peter I, on the other hand, signed the reassignment 
order and, on Apis’s advice, asked his son to apologise to Stepanović. In an 
attempt to reconcile the two rival groups of officers, Prince Alexander con-
vened a meeting, but the leaders of Black Hand refused reconciliation and 
warned the Crown Prince that he was dealing with a group of intriguers 
which was trying to turn him against a genuinely patriotic organisation.60 
Nevertheless, the friendly farewell for the reassigned officers in which some 
fifty fellow officers took part made it obvious that many garrison officers 
57 D. T. Bataković, “La Main noire (1911–1917): l’armée serbe entre démocratie et autori-
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were openly hostile to the Black Hand.61 The outbreak of the First Balkan 
War in October 1912 postponed the final showdown between the govern-
ment and the Black Hand. The rift reappeared in 1913, during the Serbo-
Bulgarian dispute over Macedonia, and again in the spring of 1914.
The Balkan Wars: From bravery to open rivalry
The Balkan Wars boosted the self-confidence of the Serbian military. The 
heroism and bravery of the members and open supporters of Black Hand, 
who bore the brunt of planning and carrying out military operations, dis-
pelled the suspicions that political dissension within the officer corps might 
be fatal for military efficiency. As evidenced by their high casualty rate, the 
former conspirators, despite being high-ranking officers (majors, lieutenant-
colonels and colonels), had fought bravely and self-effacingly, which earned 
them considerable moral prestige in the Serbian army as a whole. For his 
brilliant strategy during the wars, General Putnik was promoted to the rank 
of field-marshal (vojvoda), the first in the Serbian army. The Pašić cabinet, 
for its part, sought to capitalise upon the military success for the purpose of 
promoting the interests of the Old Radical Party. The Old Radicals filled 
most administrative posts in the newly-acquired territories.62
Within the officer corps, however, there soon emerged dissatisfaction 
at the government’s inability to ensure diplomatic recognition of the spec-
tacular military victories over the Ottomans in the battles of Kumanovo (in 
Old Serbia or the vilayet of Kosovo) and Monastir (modern Bitolj, in Slavic 
Macedonia or the vilayet of Monastir). The Pašić cabinet was also expected 
to verify further military triumphs in northern and central Albania, which 
would have been the realisation of another war aim – Serbia’s territorial ac-
cess to the Adriatic Sea, a major precondition for her political and economic 
independence from the Dual Monarchy. Instead, the Pašić cabinet yielded 
to the combined pressure of Great Powers and agreed to withdraw troops 
from the areas conquered at such an enormous cost in human life: the stra-
tegic ports and cities on the Albanian coast and its hinterland (San Giovan-
ni di Medua, Durazzo, Alessio, Tirana etc.), as well as the Scutari fortress, 
seized by allied Montenegrin troops at the cost of heavy losses. From March 
1913, the Dual Monarchy, the protector of newly-created Albania, had 
been demanding the withdrawal of Serbian troops from the Adriatic coast 
in northern Albania. Serbian troops eventually withdrew across the Crni 
Drim (Black Drin) river in early October 1913. Some 15,000 Albanians 
61 Vučković, “Unutrašnje krize Srbije”, 180; Bataković, “Sukob vojnih i civilnih vlasti”, 
480–481.
62 Bataković, “Sukob vojnih i civilnih vlasti”, 481.D. T. Bataković, Storm over Serbia  331
then raided into Serbian territory, instigating local Albanians to rebellion in 
the towns of Ohrid, Struga, Gostivar and Debar (Dibra). The Serbian army 
was again forced to act and, in doing so, crossed into Albanian territory, 
which caused another diplomatic dispute with Austria-Hungary.63 
Furthermore, the prospect of losing most of Slavic Macedonia to 
Bulgaria through Russian arbitration (“the contested zone”) caused an out-
rage among the Serbian officer corps. They looked at the situation in simple 
military terms: what was won by the sword (the disputed area of Macedo-
nia) must not be relinquished. Thus, some formerly covert disagreements 
between the military and the government came into the open.64 
In June 1913, on the eve of the Second Balkan War, initiated by Bul-
garia on account of the disputed region in Macedonia, the Serbian govern-
ment acted with particular caution, fearing Austria-Hungary’s intervention 
at the moment when Serbian troops were concentrated deep in the south, 
leaving Serbia’s northern border on the Sava, Danube and Drina rivers vir-
tually undefended. On the other hand, Pašić’s cabinet could not ignore Rus-
sia’s insistence on a peaceful solution to the dispute with Bulgaria. Contrary 
to the will of St. Petersburg, the General Staff and the Black Hand officers 
were resolutely in favour of military action that would forestall Bulgaria’s 
attack and ensure Serbia’s full control over the newly-acquired region of 
Slavic Macedonia.65 
The Pijemont openly threatened the government, should it cede some 
of the disputed territory to Bulgaria, with treason charges, while the owner 
of the Black Hand daily allegedly threatened to kill Prime Minister Pašić 
on the spot.66 During June 1913, Pašić submitted his resignation twice over 
disagreements with cabinet ministers and military circles with regard to 
the Russian Emperor’s arbitration in the dispute. When the Serbian army 
repulsed the Bulgarian attack in July 1913 and won the Second Balkan War, 
its prestige, propelled by the overwhelming national euphoria, reached its 
zenith. 
The King’s praise for the amazing efforts of the Serbian army was 
perceived by the Black Hand leadership as a strong sign of political sup-
port. This somewhat resembled the event that had taken place a year before: 
the Secretary-General of the Paris-based Office Central des Nationalités, Jean 
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Pélissier, had visited Belgrade and met with both Prime Minister Milo-
van Dj. Milovanović and Apis.67 The Black Hand leaders interpreted these 
contacts as France’s direct support not just for the Serbian cause in general 
but also for their assertive approach as well. Serbian war aims, after the 
outbreak of the war against the Ottoman Empire, were supported by many 
foreign journalists (such as Henry Barby), who were impressed with Serbia’s 
military successes and, in particular, the exceptional qualities of army com-
manders.68
However, the Black Hand turned out to be collateral damage of the 
Balkan Wars. Since its founder and main ideologist Ljubomir Jovanović 
Čupa, its president, General Ilija Radivojević, and Major Milan Vasić, the 
secretary of National Defence, perished during and after the military opera-
tions, it ceased to exist as a coherent and functional organisation. Apis was 
absent from political and military life for more than a year, fighting off the 
Maltese fever he had contracted in Kosovo during the negotiations with 
the local Albanian chieftain Isa Boletini. Many valiant Black Hand officers 
had been killed in action. Most of those who survived believed that their 
generation had won the laurels of “avengers of Kosovo” and fulfilled the na-
tional mission by liberating the medieval Serbian capitals, Prizren, Skoplje 
and Prilep. 
In spite of the fact that the Black Hand – with several hundred mem-
bers prior to the Balkan Wars – ceased to exist as a functional organisation 
with organised membership, some of the officers of the former organisation 
remained politically active and were still perceived as influential. His health 
restored, Apis – the leader of the remnants of the Black Hand (an informal 
group of around 20 to 25 officers) – was appointed Head of the General 
Staff Intelligence Department in 1913. This made it possible for a group of 
some twenty officers around him to maintain their influence in the army 
and continue their activities in neighbouring Austria-Hungary. An admirer 
of Apis and his efficiency, executive skills, loyalty and utter dedication to the 
interests of the army, Field-Marshal Radomir Putnik, Chief of the General 
Staff, considered him a great patriot and a top counterintelligence officer. 
For that reason, Apis felt himself protected and free to pursue his own po-
litical and national agenda, often contrary to the prevailing opinion within 
the army. Besides, there was a sense of solidarity among army officers in the 
matters of internal policy, regardless of their sympathy for or disapproval of 
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the Black Hand, and it was manifested on every occasion when there was a 
conflict with Pašić’s Old Radical cabinet. Since the army had been instru-
mental in adding 39,000 sq. km to the Kingdom of Serbia’s 48,500 sq. km 
and 1,290,000 new inhabitants to its population of roughly three million, 
senior officers were increasingly aware of their social importance – even 
those who had no close relations with the Black Hand.69 The argument be-
tween military leaders and cabinet ministers over funding of the army and 
the policy to be pursued in the New Territories acquired in the Balkan Wars 
escalated after the Interior Minister Stojan M. Protić replied arrogantly to 
Field-Marshal Putnik, the main architect of the military victories: “You are 
just a government clerk!”70
The prestige of Serbia after the spectacular victories in the Balkan 
Wars had a resounding echo in the Yugoslav provinces of the Dual Monar-
chy, notably among the Serbs in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia and Cro-
atia-Slavonia, and among the liberal and pro-Yugoslav Croat youth. Aus-
tria-Hungary’s Balkan policy – encouraging Albanians to confront Serbian 
troops in Kosovo (e.g. the Prochaska Affair in Prizren in 1912), promoting 
Albanian maximalist territorial demands at the London Conference of Am-
bassadors (1912–1913) and, finally, threatening with military intervention 
in order to force the Serbian army to withdraw from the Albanian littoral in 
October 1913 – was utterly hostile to Serbia and her political and national 
aspirations. In the opinion of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Leopold 
von Berchtold, expressed in August 1913, the antagonism between the Dual 
Monarchy and Serbia was irremediable (unüberbruckbar) and it would, he 
predicted, soon lead to a war.71 Viennese policy aroused the Serbian officer 
corps’ profound dislike for Austria-Hungary, which was perceived as the 
main threat to Serbia’s independence and survival as a sovereign state in the 
Balkans. As the military attaché of Austria-Hungary in Belgrade observed, 
this stance of the Serbian military was, in turn, perceived as a serious threat 
to the Dual Monarchy’s interests in the Balkans.72 
The New Territories under scrutiny
The central political issue in the territorially enlarged post-Balkan wars 
Serbia – the form and organisation of government in the liberated, newly-
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incorporated areas – became a bone of contention between the military and 
the government. In the areas of Old Serbia (the former vilayet of Kosovo 
with Skoplje as its seat) and Serbian Macedonia, the government decided to 
act in the same manner as it had been done with the regions liberated from 
the Ottomans in the past – the six districts (nahiyes) integrated into Serbia 
in 1833 and the four districts of the former sanjak of Niš in 1878: in both 
cases, Serbia’s Constitution was implemented in stages.73 Military circles, 
on the other hand, insisted on military rule in the unsettled border areas for 
reasons of national security until their definitive integration into the state 
system was possible. Field-Marshal Radomir Putnik and General Živojin 
Mišić proposed a five-year military administration. Unlike the majority of 
the Opposition (Independent Radicals, Progressives, Socialists), only the 
former Liberal Party argued for placing the newly-liberated areas under a 
strict military regime. 74
The Old Radical cabinet of Nikola Pašić also capitalised on the mili-
tary successes in the Balkan Wars and, sharing the glory with the army, was 
intent on exploiting the fruits of victory for the benefit of the governing 
party. The Old Radicals considered the new southern areas as a sphere of 
their own influence and a new source of their political and economic power. 
Their leadership, feeling somewhat threatened by the Independent Radicals 
in pre-war Serbia, saw the newly-liberated areas as “fresh dough for the 
big Radical bread loaf”.75 As a result, the Pašić government established a 
special civilian administration in the newly-acquired areas. But the need 
for frequent military actions, due to constant incursions of armed brigands 
(kaçak) from Albania, sponsored and armed by both the Austro-Hungarian 
and Young Turk governments, led to overlapping of responsibilities between 
civilian and military authorities. Furthermore, the civil servants’ proclivity 
to bribery and the poor selection of local officials often resulted in abuse 
of power and corruption.76 The army officers, committed to securing the 
borders and providing peace and security for the population in the New 
Territories, were determined to suppress corruption and abuses for both 
private and political reasons. 
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In parallel with growing discontent with military-civilian relations in 
the southern areas, another commotion in the ranks of the officer corps was 
caused by the conflict between the War Minister, General Miloš Božanović, 
and the Pašić cabinet, which ended in the Minister’s resignation. The gov-
ernment rejected his military budget and refused to grant pardon to Major 
Velimir Vemić, a well-known Black Hand member, charged with the murder 
of a disobedient soldier during the 1912 war campaign. At the request of 
the remaining Black Hand members, Božanović included his name into the 
pardon candidates list. Since Major Vemić’s pardon met with the approval 
of the officer corps, the whole affair was made public by the Old Radical 
press, which also announced a firm attitude of the Pašić cabinet towards the 
military.77 The British Minister at Belgrade saw this as the government’s first 
palpable attempt to thwart the influence of the Black Hand.78
Following General Božanović’s resignation, the government intend-
ed to appoint a civilian to the office. According to a reliable source, Miloš 
Božanović was to be replaced by Stojan M. Protić, a staunch opponent of 
the conspirators, but open threats made by the Black Hand leaders, Major 
Vojin Popović (aka Vojvoda Vuk) and Voja Tankosić, prevented the govern-
ment from appointing Protić. More than thirty senior officers were then 
approached, all of whom laid out their conditions for accepting the post. 
Finally, it was the Military Attaché in Romania, Colonel Dušan Stefanović, 
who became War Minister. He had agreed to carry out all government’s 
plans without regard for the attitude of the military.79 
It was in such an atmosphere that the interpellation regarding the 
retirement of General Mišić, who was held responsible for the inadequate 
reaction to Albanian incursions in the autumn of 1913 and the pardoning 
of Major Vemić, occasioned a heated parliamentary debate. The statement 
of Stojan M. Protić, Interior Minister, to the Old Radical daily Samouprava 
(Self-government) that “there are impermissible praetorian ambitions in 
our Army”, drew a fierce response from the Opposition. The leader of the 
Independent Radicals, Milorad Drašković, accused the Old Radical cabi-
net of instigating divisions in the Army and rebuked it for focusing on the 
Vemić case even though, according to him, there were some fifty or sixty 
similar cases. Minister Protić replied by reproaching the Opposition for at-
tacking the government in the Pijemont and thus encouraging the frustrated 
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military officers’ disobedience to the government.80 A series of government 
actions, undertaken with the aim of exposing the unlawful activities of Apis 
and the remaining faction of the Black Hand, curbing their influence on 
political developments and forestalling their further anti-government activ-
ity, were also intended to discredit those military circles that were unwilling 
to accept the administration introduced in the newly-incorporated areas.81 
The sharp tone of the conflict was set by Protić’s polemical style; he called 
upon the public to stand up in defence of the constitutional order from “ir-
responsible military factors”.
The Old Radical organ Samouprava brought a series of articles by 
the Interior Minister Protić openly accusing the Black Hand of harbouring 
“praetorian ambitions” incompatible with the constitutional order. In the 
National Assembly, Protić claimed that a “handful of officers who have their 
own newspaper [Pijemont] wants to keep in check not only the entire of-
ficer corps but also to put a bridle on the government and the legislature”.82 
Warning about the “influential and powerful officers who want the state to 
dance to their tune”, the Samouprava admitted that the Old Radical cabinet 
was under pressure by Black Hand officers and stressed that there were 
moments in this struggle “when it was at risk of succumbing and letting 
the praetorians rule the roost”. The Opposition (notably the Independent 
Radicals) was accused of actively collaborating with “irresponsible factors in 
the country” in their opposition to the government’s decisions.83 
The Priority Decree and a failed plan for a military coup, May–June 1914
The relationship between the legislative, executive and military authorities 
in the newly-incorporated areas was not clearly defined because of the ten-
sion caused by sporadic expressions of discontent among the Albanian mi-
nority and the incursions of paramilitary groups from Albania and Bulgaria. 
Moreover, the local administrative system, continually supplemented with 
new laws and decrees, gave the Pašić cabinet free rein to pursue the interests 
80 Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine Kraljevine Srbije, XXXVIII red. sastanak, 14 
January 1915; Vučković, “Unutrašnje krize Srbije”, 184–185.
81 The discovery of an embezzlement of Officers Cooperative funds (Oficirska zadruga) 
in May 1914 coincided with a flare-up of the tension between the military and civilian 
authorities over the implementation of the “Priority Decree” in the liberated areas and 
thus came in handy for the Radical press to blow up the affair out of proportion, cf. 
Vučković, “Unutrašnje krize Srbije”, 185. 
82 Quoted in Pijemont, 15 (28) February 1914.
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of the governing party to the exclusion of the Opposition and the Army 
from decision-making process.
Foreign diplomatic reports indicated that the friction between civil-
ian and military authorities in the New Territories threatened to escalate 
into an open confrontation. The rivalry took a turn for the worse after the 
incident in Skoplje between General Damnjan Popović, the army officer in 
charge of the New Territories, and District Governor Novaković, over the 
order of precedence at a church celebration.84 This incident was connected 
with Protić’s Decree on Celebrating National Holidays and Popular Festivals 
(known as “Priority Decree”) released on 21 March 1914 which gave prece-
dence to civilian officials as opposed to an earlier decree favouring military 
officials. The purpose of the Decree was to demonstrate the government’s 
resolve to thwart the attempts of the Black Hand and the entire officer 
corps to rise above civilian authority. However, the Decree had the oppo-
site effect. Dissatisfied with the Old Radical administration of the liberated 
areas and the status of the military there, the officer corps aligned with 
the Black Hand. General Damnjan Popović, one of the most influential 
among the former Black Hand members, seized the first opportunity to 
violate the Priority Decree, and was promptly retired in consequence. A 
somewhat provocative retirement celebration that the officers in Skoplje 
organised for their otherwise little-loved commander was a telling sign of 
the rising discontent in their ranks, which had been simmering since the 
retirement of General Živojin Mišić for his allegedly inadequate dealing 
with the incursions from Albania in September 1913. Due to the influ-
ence of Black Hand, Popović was promptly and defiantly elected President 
of the Management Board of the Officers Cooperative (Oficirska zadruga). 
Popović’s arrival in Belgrade, and Field-Marshal Putnik’s election for Presi-
dent of the Supervisory Board of the Cooperative, further encouraged the 
dissent within army ranks in general, and among Black Hand supporters in 
particular.85 The officer corps’ strongly expressed unanimity on the “Priority 
Decree” softened up their cautious attitude towards the remnants of Black 
Hand and their meddling in domestic politics. Since the Priority Decree 
crisis, the actions of the officers corps undertaken “in defence of the honour 
of the Army” were quite synchronised.86
84 Ibid.; Bataković, “Sukob vojnih i civilnih vlasti”, 483.
85 Cf. Mićić, “Srpski oficiri, njihova uloga i značaj”; M.A.E., N.S., Serbie, nos. 139 and 
147, Descos to Doumergue, Belgrade, 4 and 14 May 1914 respectively; TNA, FO, vol. 
371/2099, Peckham to Crackenthorpe, Skoplje, 5 May 1914; ÖUA, vol. VIII, no. 9649, 
Giesl to Berchtold, Belgrade, 8 May 1914. 
86 An act of disobedience occurred in Valjevo, where the commander of the Drina Divi-
sion refused to greet Minister of the Economy Velizar Janković. Several leading senior Balcanica XLIV (2013) 338
The Opposition got involved in the Pašić cabinet’s conflict with the 
Black Hand and the Army with a view to bringing down the former. By es-
tablishing ties with the Black Hand, the Opposition bloc, dominated by the 
Independent Radicals, deepened the crisis and fuelled it further by siding 
openly with the Army and by embarking on parliamentary obstruction.87 
Although the Old Radical majority in the National Assembly was a narrow 
one, dependent on two Social Democratic votes, it left Pašić some room for 
manoeuvring. He seized the favourable moment to split up the Opposition 
bloc.88 The Opposition nonetheless succeeded in obstructing the passage of 
some already prepared bills. In the view of the French Minister at Belgrade, 
the crisis caused such a public stir that even foreign policy issues such as 
that of Durazzo (an important maritime port in Albania still under Serbian 
control) were temporarily pushed into the background.89
All political parties expected King Peter I to resolve the crisis but, 
as observed by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, neither “the 
King’s well-known sympathies for the conspirators nor those of the Crown 
Prince prevail at the moment, because the downfall of Pašić’s cabinet would 
entail a serious internal crisis”.90 The King tried to find an acceptable solu-
tion in consultation with Old Radical leaders and military commanders. Pe-
ter I was pressuring Pašić to revoke the controversial Priority Decree, while 
promising him in return the mandate to conduct new elections. Pašić seems 
to have favoured this solution, but his Interior Minister was inflexible in the 
matter of the Priority Decree. Dissatisfied with the stubborn position of the 
Old Radical cabinet, King Peter I decided to side with the army and even 
officers were embittered to the point of being ready to resign. The Pašić government had 
the most disgruntled officers transferred from Belgrade, but the King refused to sign 
retirement decrees for D. T. Dimitrijević Apis, V. Tankosić and some other Black Hand 
members. Cf. M.A.E., N.S., Serbie, no. 139; Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914, vol. II, 101.
87 ÖUA, vol. VIII, no. 9702, Giesl to Berchtold, Belgrade, 21 May 1914; Vučković, 
“Unutrašnje krize Srbije”, 187.
88 TNA FO, vol. 371/2098, Crackenthorpe to Grey, Belgrade, 26 May 1914. The fric-
tion provoked by the Priority Decree led the government to ask its Minister at Berlin to 
report on the German order of precedence on formal occasions involving both civilian 
and military officials. The Serbian Minister in Berlin Bogićević reported that the mili-
tary had precedence in most cases (the commander of a corps with the rank of general 
had precedence over a district governor), but if a civilian and a military official had the 
same rank, precedence was given to the one appointed first. Cf. Dokumenti o spoljnoj 
politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914, vol. VII/1, eds. V. Dedijer and Ž. Anić (Belgrade: 
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1980), doc. nos. 646, 802 and 803.
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promised Field-Marshal Putnik to get rid of Pašić.91 The Russian Minister 
at Belgrade reported that the King had demanded that Field-Marshal Put-
nik and War Minister Stefanović take vigorous steps against the activity of 
the Black Hand. On the other hand, the Pašić cabinet, with the assistance 
of the War Minister, sought to sow dissent among its opponents in the 
army.92 
Leaders of the former Black Hand also sought support against the 
government. Apis was consulting the Opposition leaders in May 1914 and 
he did not exclude a military coup as the last resort solution to the crisis.93 
Some leaders of the Independent Radicals, including Milorad Drašković, 
seem to have consented to a coup that would be limited to the New Territo-
ries – and hopefully cause the fall of Pašić’s cabinet.94 It was because of these 
consultations that Apis instructed his trusted officers in Skoplje and other 
cities in Serbian Macedonia “to drive out a couple of district governors [ap-
pointed] in the New Territories and send them to Belgrade complete with 
their suitcases, and here in Belgrade it will be our [Black Hand’s and Inde-
pendent Radicals’] concern to smooth things over”.95 Slobodan Jovanović, a 
legal historian and a witness of this conflict, believed that Apis had probably 
counted on the support of the local population in Serbian Macedonia.96 
However, the senior officers to whom the instruction was dispatched in 
91 Vučković, “Unutrašnje krize Srbije t”, 188; Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914, vol. II, 101.
92 A group of officers from the Belgrade Garrison (mostly consisting of Old Radicals 
supporters), expressed to the War Minister Stefanović their disapproval of the conduct 
of their fellow officers (Black Hand supporters). Among the officers serving outside 
Belgrade, their protest was supported by only two officers from the Ohrid Garrison. 
After that, a few senior officers serving at the Ministry of War and military schools 
were retired, among them Field-Marshal Putnik’s son-in-law, Commandant of the 
Non-Commissioned Officer School. Putnik himself was sent out of Belgrade on an 
assignment, and the distribution of the Pijemont and Zvono (Bell) in the Nove Ob-
lasti (New Territories) in the south was banned. At that point Pijemont had roughly 
14,000 subscribers in the New Territories. Cf. M.A.E, no. 203, Descos to Doumergue, 
26 May 1914; Marco [Božin Simić], “Državna kriza juna 1914 i juna 1928”, Nova Ev-
ropa XVIII/9 (11 September 1928), 266). 
93 Borivoje Nešković, Istina o Solunskom procesu (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1953), 158–160.
94 Drašković’s denial at the Salonika Trial in 1917 that he had consented to the coup is 
understandable, but he did not deny that he had discussed with Apis the issue of poten-
tial overthrow of the Pašić government. Cf. Vučković, “Unutrašnje krize Srbije”, 181. 
95 Ibid.; see also Milan Ž. Živanović, Solunski proces 1917. Prilog za proučavanje političke 
istorije Srbije od 1903. do 1918. godine (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 
1955), 219.
96 Slobodan Jovanović, Moji savremenici (Windsor, Canada: Avala Printing and Pub-
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May 1914 (among others, Colonel Milutin Lazarević, Chief of Staff in the 
Troops in the New Territories, and Colonel Dušan Plazina, Commander of 
the Non-Commissioned Officer School at Skoplje), were not in favour of 
such a drastic move, having assessed that most officers and soldiers were less 
than enthusiastic about the possible coup, even if restricted to the New Ter-
ritories.97 Apis and a group of his closest supporters were clearly rejected by 
their fellow officers. It was not only a major setback to the remnants of the 
Black Hand and Apis himself, but also a clear indication that senior army 
officers, including the former Black Hand members, firmly rejected Apis’ 
authority to issue orders that ran against the army’s constitutional role. The 
courageous “no” to Apis in fact proved that loyalty to the democratic system 
and constitutional order had prevailed among the top military officers. 
Although this was not the end of the whole affair, it was certainly 
not a coincidence that the Pijemont wrote that King was informed that 
an outbreak of “bloody clashes between the army and the police can be 
expected any minute”. It therefore seems highly likely that the planned ex-
emption of the New Territories from civil authority was supposed to be a 
testing ground for the eventual overthrow of Pašić.98 The dramatic appeal 
of the newly-appointed Commander of the New Territories, General Peter 
Bojović, addressed to the Minister of War on 3 June 1914, immediately af-
ter the resignation of Pašić’s cabinet, confirmed concerns about the attitude 
of some officers. They were “tending to give vent to their discontent with the 
inappropriate conduct of police officials towards them both in formal and 
informal situations, and with the writing of some newspapers against the 
officers which is aimed at stirring up divisions among them.”99 
On behalf of the Kosovo Division, General Bojović demanded that 
the “Priority Decree” be revoked or amended, but he also stressed that the 
army would continue “to serve only the King and the Fatherland, and by 
no means particular political parties”. He ordered the division command-
ers to ensure the strict implementation of the officers’ code of conduct in 
both spirit and letter and demanded their reports on the condition of the 
troops.100 Field Marshal Putnik and General Damnjan Popović put pressure 
on the King, on account of unrest in the officers’ corps and General Bojović’s 
request. According to the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, Baron 
Giesl, the two high-ranking officers, supported by the Crown Prince, as-
97 Ibid.
98 Pijemont, no. 129, 10 May 1914.
99 VAS, V-483-1-1, Bojović to Stefanović, Skoplje, 3 June 1914; cf. Nešković, Istina o 
Solunskom procesu, 25–26; Dragoslav Janković, Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje 1914–1915 
(Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1973), 88–89.
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sured the King that there would be unrest in the army “ unless the rights it 
claims are recognised”.101 A few weeks earlier, some officers from Monastir 
County (Bitoljski okrug), dissatisfied with the government’s policies and the 
weak response to incursions from Albania and Bulgaria, had been willing to 
resort to guerrilla warfare.102 
However, Prime Minister Pašić remained adamant as regards the 
“Priority Decree” and on 2 June 1914 his cabinet resigned. The Indepen-
dent Radicals, having failed to put together a coalition government, of-
fered the King a homogenous cabinet in which the King’s personal friend, 
Živojin Balugdžić, the Serbian Minister at Athens, would become Foreign 
Minister. At that point, the Black Hand stepped in, nominating Jovan M. 
Jovanović, the Serbian Minister at Vienna, for the office.103 This move made 
plain the Black Hand’s intention to place yet another area of public affairs 
under their control. Its alliance with the Independent Radicals was based on 
common dissatisfaction with the Old Radicals in the office and, in particu-
lar with Pašić’s dovish foreign policy. The Samouprava, on the other hand, 
warned the Crown that inviting the opposition minority to form a govern-
ment would be a violation of the Constitution.104 When King Peter I ap-
peared to have finally decided to invite the Independent Radicals to form a 
new cabinet, the Russian Minister at Belgrade, Nikolai Hartwig, interfered 
at the suggestion of Pašić.
Hartwig exerted considerable influence on Serbia’s national policy. 
Foreign diplomats in Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian and French Ministers 
in particular, believed that he was the architect of Serbia’s foreign policy 
and more powerful than both the King and Premier Pašić. An adamant 
Austrophobe, and strongly backed by St. Petersburg’s conservative and pan-
Slav circles, Hartwig acted according to his own lights, often opposing his 
superior, Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov. Hartwig considered Sazonov 
as indecisive and too conciliatory when it was necessary to hold firm in 
the face of Austria-Hungary’s aggressive stance. In the diplomatic corps in 
Belgrade, Hartwig was nicknamed “Viceroy of Serbia” for taking the side of 
Serbia on all occasions. His role in Serbia’s domestic crisis in the spring of 
1914 was considerable.105
As for Pašić, French diplomatic reports suggest that his visit to St. 
Petersburg in early 1914 had solidified his status in the eyes of the Russian 
101 ÖUA, vol. VIII, no. 9819, Giesl to Berchtold, Belgrade, 6 June 1914.
102 TNA, FO, vol. 371/2009, Craig to Crackenthorpe, Monastir, 24 April 1914.
103  M.A.E.,  N.S.,  Serbie,  no.  203;  Vučković,  “Unutrašnje  krize  Srbije”,  188.
104 Samouprava, 12 June 1914. 
105 M.A.E., N.S., Serbie, no. 201; cf. Jovanović, Moji savremenici, 200; Marco [Božin 
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government. Tsarist Russia counted on Pašić as her faithful ally and a mod-
erate politician loyal to wider Slavic interests. Since any shift in Serbia’s for-
eign policy was likely to pose a serious threat to Russia’s interests in the Bal-
kans, Hartwig began to pursue a vigorous policy of negotiations with a view 
to supporting the Old Radicals.106 Using the compelling authority of Russia 
in order to curb the Opposition’s demands and criticising the Independent 
Radicals for their close ties with the Black Hand, Hartwig practically forced 
the King to invite Pašić to form cabinet again.107 The dominance of Premier 
Pašić, backed by Hartwig, over the ailing King Peter I was best reflected in 
the unchanged composition of his cabinet. Moreover, Pašić’s coming into 
office on 11 June gave the Old Radicals a good chance for remaining in 
power by winning the elections scheduled for August 1914. The only con-
cession to the monarch by the Old Radical cabinet was an amendment to 
Article 5 of the Priority Decree, which gave precedence to military over 
civilian authorities except in cases when civilian officials acted on behalf of 
the government.108 
By extending Pašić’s term as Prime Minister and endorsing the gov-
ernment’s action against the remnants of the Black Hand, King Peter I 
suffered a serious political defeat. Old, almost deaf and quite weak after a 
minor stroke, the King lacked the strength and authority needed to resolve 
the crisis. Indebted to the army in general and some of the former conspira-
tors in particular, Peter I became a liability both to Pašić and to Hartwig.109 
His decision to reassign his royal prerogatives to his son, Crown Prince 
Alexander, was therefore perceived by the French Minister at Belgrade as a 
“last-minute one, made under Russian pressure”.110 The King’s withdrawal, 
in fact a tacit abdication, as it was described in the Russian press, became 
clear in the light of Crown Prince Alexander’s role in the crisis.
106 M.A.E., N.S., Serbie, no. 203.
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Alexander’s neutral stance at the early stage of the crisis was rather 
tactical, and stemmed from his relationship with Pašić and the Black Hand. 
Crown Prince had been at odds with the latter since the transfer of several 
officers loyal to him – the group known as the White Hand – from Bel-
grade in early 1912. Alexander was still careful enough not to severe his 
formally good relations with the most influential members of the Black 
Hand. His financial contribution to the Pijemont, personal concern to se-
cure good medical care for Apis at the beginning of the First Balkan War, 
approval of the Officers Cooperative’s disbursements to the Black Hand, 
made him look good in the eyes of the clandestine organisation. This image 
became even better when Alexander joined military circles, including the 
Black Hand, in their pressure on Prime Minister Pašić to refuse the cession 
of any of the territories liberated in the First Balkan War to Bulgaria.111 In 
the view of foreign diplomats in Serbia, Crown Prince’s sympathies during 
the Priority Decree crisis lay with the army rather than with Pašić, despite 
some reservations about the Black Hand; thus, his departure for a spa for 
medical treatment during that crisis was interpreted as an attempt to avoid 
taking sides publicly.112 
Crown Prince’s attitude towards Pašić was likely influenced by his 
frustration with Pašić’s policy of compromise pursued during the Balkan 
Wars. Alexander obviously sought for his place at the top of political power 
between Pašić, on one side, and the Black Hand, on the other. His ties with 
the small group of officers loyal to him (White Hand) were supposed to be 
a stepping stone for the rise of his personal influence. Reports of foreign 
diplomats in Belgrade described Alexander as being sympathetic not only 
to the army but also to some members of the former Black Hand: at the 
early stages of the Priority Decree crisis, prior to Hartwig’s involvement, 
Crown Prince had supported the bid to protect the supremacy of military 
over civil authorities.113 His long discussions with Hartwig, who dangled 
before him the prospect of regency, and even of marriage to a Russian prin-
cess, swayed the ambitious Crown Prince towards Premier Pašić.114 Pašić 
111 Jovanović, Moji savremenici, 404; Vučković, “Unutrašnje krize Srbije i Prvi svetski 
rat”, 182. 
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and the Russian Minister skilfully manoeuvred in order to present Alexan-
der’s regency as a concession to the army, which, in turn, secured the con-
tinuation of Pašić’s premiership. Austro-Hungarian diplomats believed that 
the Black Hand was so powerful that neither Pašić nor the Crown Prince 
could confront it “as long as the whole affair can be settled peacefully”.115 At 
the early stages of the election campaign, all the Opposition parties joined 
forces for the first time and submitted a joint electoral list, which, judging 
by the articles published in the Pijemont, enjoyed the support of Apis and 
his followers. The elections, however, did not take place because of the out-
break of the Great War.
Serbia’s remarkable victories in the Balkan Wars created an atmo-
sphere of high expectations among the Serbs in the Dual Monarchy; they 
suddenly became impatient to accomplish their national unification with 
Serbia. The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade assessed that the Ser-
bian army, “imbued with chauvinism and hatred for Austria-Hungary would 
try to push every Serbian government in the direction of national chauvin-
ism and Austrophobia”.116 Other foreign diplomats, on the contrary, looked 
at the conflict in the light of Serbia’s quest for full sovereignty and stressed 
the continuity of her cautious foreign policy. In contrast to Russian Min-
ister Hartwig, whose reports played down the role of the military faction 
around Apis, probably for tactical reasons, Western diplomats underlined 
the still tangible influence of Black Hand’s remnants, and largely saw Rus-
sia’s involvement in the solution of the Priority Decree crisis as yet another 
proof of Serbia’s reliance on this Great Power. 
Nevertheless, the high expectations for national unification were pit-
ted against Serbia’s massive war losses, which dictated a different policy: 
it was necessary to organise the state that nearly doubled in size and had 
numerous problems with hostile minorities and porous borders.117 It was 
also obvious that Russia’s influence prevailed over the temporary alliance 
between  the  Independent  Radicals-led  opposition  and  Apis-controlled 
Vučković, “Unutrašnje krize Srbije”, 189. The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade 
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military faction formed against Pašić’s Old Radical cabinet. Pursuing her 
own interests, Russia backed Pašić and thus helped civil authorities in their 
ongoing conflict with the military. The fact that the helm of the country re-
mained in the hands of Pašić’s pro-Russian cabinet suited Austria-Hungary 
as well, partly because of Pašić’s conciliatory attitude towards Vienna, and 
partly because of the ongoing negotiations concerning the Eastern railways. 
Of utmost importance for Viennese diplomacy was the assessment that the 
Old Radicals would, at least for a while, “suppress the army’s influence on 
the political leadership of the country”. The influence of the “irresponsible 
factors” within the Army in post-1903 Serbia clearly indicated the fragility 
of her democracy and state institutions. Nevertheless, it was democracy that 
prevailed, as evidenced by the outcome of the Priority Decree crisis, and 
Pašić was looking forward to securing his victory over Lt.-Colonel Apis and 
the remnants of the Black Hand. 
The Black Hand and Young Bosnia 
In spite of the victory of democratic forces over military clique in the spring 
of 1914, Serbia’s international position was far from being secured. The fre-
quent incursions from Albania, supported by Austria-Hungary, were still 
not efficiently prevented, while the pending project of a real union with 
Montenegro, which included joint institutions for defence, finance and for-
eign policy, was at the forefront of Pašić’s mind. There were also alarm-
ing developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Serbs became again 
the main target of various punitive actions. The Young Bosnia organisation 
emerged in opposition to the colonial rule of the Dual Monarchy in a Eu-
ropean province only 600 kilometres away from Vienna Such mistreatment, 
and particularly discrimination against the Bosnian Serbs, inevitably led to 
various forms of turmoil. 
Young Bosnia was founded in 1910–1911 by the second generation 
of the Serbian youth which grew up under Austro-Hungarian occupa-
tion, deprived of political freedoms, basic social and national rights. Cre-
ated on the pattern of Mazzini’s Young Italy, it was an ardently patriotic 
anti-Habsburg organisation, Serb-led but open to all religious and ethnic 
groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Young Bosnians were committed 
to their struggle against the Dual Monarchy’s increasingly discriminatory 
rule and willing to make any personal sacrifice. On the day of the open-
ing of the Bosnian Diet (Bosanski Sabor), in June 1910, one of the Young 
Bosnia’s leaders, Bogdan Žerajić, committed suicide after having failed to 
assassinate the Austro-Hungarian governor and set an example of heroic 
self-sacrifice for the sacred cause of national freedom. Several assassination 
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a growing tension in the relationship between the Bosnian Serbs and their 
Austro-Hungarian masters. In 1912, when the vast majority of the Serbs in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina celebrated the victories of Serbia and Montenegro in 
the Balkan Wars as their own, the state-sponsored oppression targeted all 
Serb organisations.118 
Further discriminatory measures undertaken by Austro-Hungarian 
administration aggravated internal tension. The abolition of the post of civil 
adlatus in 1912 was a prelude to introducing “emergency measures”, with 
all the powers concentrated in the hands of the military and civil gover-
nor (landeschef). General Oskar Potiorek was not responsible to the Finance 
Ministry, which had hitherto administered Bosnia-Herzegovina, but to the 
War Ministry in Vienna.119 Between the introduction of emergency mea-
sures in May 1913 (in response to the Scutari crisis and Austria-Hungary’s 
war threats to Serbia and Montenegro) and the Sarajevo assassination in 
June 1914, General Potiorek orchestrated a series of show trials for high 
treason against Bosnian Serbs in the towns of Bijeljina, Foča and Banjaluka. 
Various associations, from choral and gymnastic (Sokol) to religious and 
educational, were outlawed by the Bosnian governor.120 For that reason, one 
of the Young Bosnians deemed the assassination of Franz Ferdinand a logi-
cal response to “emergency measures”.121 
The Young  Bosnians,  a  mixture  of  patriots,  anarchists  and  social 
revolutionaries, were influenced by the teachings of Kropotkin, Bakounin, 
Nietzsche and Masaryk. They embraced a pro-Serbian and pro-Yugoslav 
policy in order to overthrow the detested Austrian rule which, after the 
1908 annexation, was considered both illegal and immoral.122 The contro-
versial relationship between the Black Hand and Young Bosnia is difficult 
to understand unless all the elements, including the local political culture 
118 Milorad Ekmečić, “Impact of the Balkan Wars on the Society in Bosnia and Herze-
govina“, in Kiraly & Djordjevic, eds., East Central European Society in the Balkan Wars, 
266–285.
119 When  the  rule  of  law  was  practically  suspended,  the  most  moderate  group  of 
Serbs, headed by Gligorije Jeftanović (father-in-law of the Serbian diplomat Miro-
slav Spalajković), left the Bosnian Diet, a non-representative body with limited powers. 
Their place was taken by the so-called “loyal Serbs” of Danilo Dimović. With little or 
no support of the Serb electorate, they were necessary to Austro-Hungarian authorities 
to keep up appearances.
120 Most of 710 societies and associations suspected of being completely or partially 
controlled by the Bosnian Serbs were banned (in total, 296 Serbian and 230 mixed 
societies). Cf. Vojislav Bogićević, “Iznimne mjere u Bosni i Hercegovini u maju 1913”, 
Godišnjak istorijskog društva Bosne i Hercegovine (Sarajevo 1955), 209–218).
121 Bataković, The Serbs of Bosnia & Herzegovina, 84.
122 V. Dedijer, Road to Sarajevo (London: The MacGibbon & Kee Ltd., 1967), 238–250.D. T. Bataković, Storm over Serbia  347
and mentality, are taken into account. A group of Young Bosnians came to 
Belgrade to seek assistance for assassination of various Austro-Hungarian 
governors and senior state officials, including Burian, Biliński and General 
Potiorek. However, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the General Inspector of 
the Army, became the primary target after the announcement of his pres-
ence at military manoeuvres. 
The forthcoming visit of Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne to 
Sarajevo, along with his inspection of military manoeuvres on the border 
with Serbia, was scheduled for St. Vitus Day (Vidovdan), the hallowed an-
niversary of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo. This timing was considered as an-
other humiliating provocation against the Serbs as a whole, and particularly 
against Bosnian Serbs who, unlike their compatriots in the liberated areas of 
Turkey-in-Europe, remained under foreign colonial rule.123 Moreover, the 
reports submitted to Lt.-Colonel Apis by his informers from Bosnia and 
Croatia suggested that Austro-Hungarian military manoeuvres were not 
just another provocation but rather a portent of the forthcoming aggression 
against Serbia. In contrast, the Pašić government, conciliatory towards Aus-
tria-Hungary after the settlement of the Albanian affair, was preoccupied 
with domestic matters and the election campaign, and it did not consider 
the Archduke’s visit to Sarajevo as a potential treat to Serbia.124
It was not before Lt.-Colonel Apis’ agents organised the crossing 
of a few Young Bosnians into Bosnia that the civilian border authorities 
informed the Interior Ministry of the suspicious actions of military intel-
ligence. The police failed to prevent some armed members of Young Bosnia 
to cross the Drina in the night of 1/2 June. The latter acted under protection 
of certain border officers close to Lt.-Colonel Apis and the remnants of the 
Black Hand.125 This information, presented at the cabinet meeting by Inte-
123 D. Djordjević, “Tradition of Kosovo in Formation of Serbian Statehood in the Nine-
teenth Century”, in Kosovo. The Legacy of a Medieval Battle, eds. Thomas Emmert and 
Wayne S. Vucinich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1991), 309–330. Cf. the 
latest biography of Franz Ferdinand by Jean-Paul Bled, François-Ferdinand d’Autriche 
(Paris: Tallandier, 2012).
124 There is no substantial evidence for the Russian Military Attaché in Belgrade Colo-
nel Artamanov’s involvement in the Sarajevo assassination, apart from his frequent 
contacts with Apis. See Viktor Artamanov, “Erinnerungen an meine Militärattachezeit 
in Belgrade”, Berliner Monatshefte (July and August 1938), 583–602; some new insights 
can be found in the memoirs, recently translated from Russian (Balkan Reminescences) 
of the Russian Chargé d’Affaires in Belgrade, Basil de Strandman, who took office 
after the sudden death of Nikolai Hartwig in July 1914: Vasilij Štrandman, Balkanske 
uspomene, vol. I, part 1–2 (Belgrade: Žagor, 2009), 258–272.
125 Popović, “Rad organizacije “‘Ujedinjenje ili smrt’”; Ljubibratić, Mlada Bosna i Sara-
jevski atentat, 42; for more detail, see Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914, vol. II, 111–112.Balcanica XLIV (2013) 348
rior Minister Protić, alarmed the Pašić cabinet. Prime Minister knew that 
Apis was willing to undertake any adventurous and highly risky enterprise. 
Pašić also believed that Serbia needed at least two decades of continuous 
peace to fully absorb the areas acquired in 1912–1913. In June 1914, his 
main concern was to win the elections again, despite the fact that the Op-
position was supported by his fierce opponent Apis and his followers. The 
illegal transfer of unknown foreign individuals from Serbia into Habsburg-
held Bosnia led to Pašić’s energetic request for investigation into military 
intelligence operations carried out by Apis. Unaware of Apis’s secret plans 
and  chronically  dissatisfied  with  the  government’s  attitude  towards  the 
army, the ailing Field-Marshal Putnik firmly rejected Pašić’s demand but 
promised an internal military inquiry.126 
Prime Minister Pašić, still concerned about Apis’s hidden agenda and 
determined to avoid any complications that might arise because of Bosnia, 
instructed his reliable diplomat, Jovan M. Jovanović, the Serbian Minister in 
Vienna, to alert Leon von Biliński, who had been Minister of Finance and 
the governor of Bosnia since 1912, to the possibility of unrest during the 
Archduke’s visit to Sarajevo and to advise its postponement. Lacking any 
reliable information on the plans of the group of Bosnian Serbs smuggled 
into Bosnia across the Drina, Jovanović conveyed the message to Biliński in 
a delicate diplomatic manner. However, Biliński seems to have not realised 
the importance of this friendly warning, and he did not pass it on to the 
Emperor and the cabinet in Vienna. This misunderstanding eventually led 
to the Sarajevo tragedy.127 
The relationship between Apis and the Young Bosnians during their 
stay in Belgrade has remained unclear. Apis seems to have never met the 
future assassins, and his support for their plans was probably more theo-
retical than practical. Had Apis really wanted them to proceed with the 
assassination, he would have probably given them the necessary instruc-
tions himself. Despite having been urged by Apis’ s emissaries to abort their 
mission, the Young Bosnians, true to their revolutionary outlook, remained 
determined to murder the Archduke in order to demonstrate their oppo-
sition to the colonial rule of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia-Herzegovina.128 
126 Dedijer, Road to Sarajevo, 388–392.
127 Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914, vol. II, 123–130.
128 According to the later testimony of the Black Hand supporter Čedomir A. Popović, 
Apis and Tankosić initially approved the departure of three Young Bosnians, Gavrilo 
Princip, Trifko Grabež and Nedeljko Čabrinović, for Sarajevo. Due to opposition from 
the former Black Hand, they later tried to stop them but failed to prevent the assas-
sination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. According to some less reliable sources, Apis 
and Tankosić seem to have believed that removing Franz Ferdinand, whom they saw D. T. Bataković, Storm over Serbia  349
The fateful Sarajevo assassination provoked mass persecutions of Bosnian 
Serbs throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Serbian government con-
demned it immediately.129
Apis later confided, with considerable discomfort, to his close friend, 
Antonije Antić, that he had been unaware of the Young Bosnians’ determi-
nation to carry out the assassination and explained that he had only wanted 
them to frighten the Archduke.130 The controversy, however, continues. To 
a great extent, it is the murky role of other officials, former members of the 
defunct Black Hand, whose assistance to the Young Bosnians was instru-
mental, that accounts for the controversy. In contrast to Apis, his right-hand 
associate Vojislav Tankosić stated after his arrest that the assassination had 
been carried out as an act “against Pašić”, which firmly places the whole 
issue into the context of military-civilian rivalry in Serbia.131 Austria-Hun-
gary’s reaction which eventually led to the Great War was a prelude to the 
long-planned war against Serbia. 
When the Belgrade government was presented with the ultimatum 
in July 1914 the Prime Minister Pašić was amidst the election campaign in 
southern Serbia, while the ailing Chief of the General Staff, Field-Marshal 
Putnik, was undergoing medical treatment in an Austrian spa. Unprepared 
for war, militarily and financially exhausted by the successive Balkan Wars 
(the Serbian army lacked 120,000 rifles as well as other war material) and 
with the New Territories still far from being integrated, the Serbian gov-
ernment spared no effort to prevent the outbreak of war. In all European 
cabinets, Serbia’s response to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was consid-
ered diplomatically impeccable: the only demands that were rejected were 
those incompatible with the independence of the country – it was impos-
sible to allow the Austro-Hungarian police to search for potential aides to 
the perpetrators of the Sarajevo assassination on Serbia’s sovereign soil. At 
the same time, the Belgrade government expressed, through British repre-
sentatives in Serbia, its readiness to fulfil, with minor rectifications, all other 
as the main champion of Austria-Hungary’s policy of bringing Serbia to heel, would 
mean removing the main obstacle to Serbian unification. Cf. Č. A. Popović, “Sarajevski 
atentat i org. ‘Ujedinjenje ili Smrt’ ”, Nova Evropa (26 June 1932), 407–408; Dedijer, 
Sarajevo 1914, vol. II, 120–122. 
129 Štrandman, Balkanske uspomene, 260–265.
130 Antonije Antić, Beleške, eds. Bora Dimitrijević & Jelica Ilić (Zaječar: Zadužbina 
“Nikola Pašić”, 2010), 338–339.
131 Vladimir Dedijer, “Sarajevo. Fifty Years After”, Foreign Affairs (July 1964); Dedijer, 
Sarajevo 1914, vol. II, 124.Balcanica XLIV (2013) 350
demands set out in the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum.132 The military-civil 
rivalry, resolved temporarily in June 1914, would resurface in a later phase of 
the Great War. The final showdown with Colonel Apis and his Black Hand 
comrades would take place during the show trial in Salonika in 1917.133 
In conclusion, there is almost a consensus among serious scholars 
that it was the Annexation Crisis of 1908, and not Serbia’s attitude in 1914, 
that led to the Great War. Thus, in the view of “pre-1914 European interna-
tional politics, the Bosnian crisis is considered to be a decisive step toward 
the First World War”. There were remarkable structural similarities in Ger-
many’s role in the course of the Annexation Crisis in 1908–1909 and in July 
Crisis in 1914: “In both cases Austria was acting against Serbia. Serbia was 
backed by Russia while Austria was unconditionally backed by Germany. In 
1909 Russia backed down, however. In 1914 both sides remained stubborn 
and the crisis escalated into the European war.”134
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